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Abstract 
 
This thesis seeks to develop an alternative approach to the evaluation of humanitarian aid in 
order to make the gaps left by the current approaches smaller. To do this, the thesis applies 
McConnell’s framework to the case of Korea’s response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake and 
compares it to a prior evaluation done using the DAC-OECD criteria, currently the dominant 
framework in the humanitarian sector. It thus explores three different dimensions of Korea’s 
response: process, programme and politics, and then determines the degree of success or 
failure of each dimension in order to investigate the validity and scope of McConnell’s theory 
on the evaluation of humanitarian aid. 
 
This study affirms that McConnell’s theory helps to alleviate the difficulties and complexities 
of the evaluation of humanitarian response. His theory provides a broader perspective on 
evaluating humanitarian aid by assessing three aspects of policy which allows for the political 
dimension to be better understood, and easily determine the degree of success or failure 
through the provision of detailed criteria and a five-level continuum from success to failure: 
success, durable success, conflicted success, precarious success and failure. It is thus possible 
to argue that McConnell’s theory alleviates the shortcomings of existing approaches to 
humanitarian evaluation by widening the scope of evaluation and specifying the degree of 
success or failure of humanitarian aid. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
1.1 Overview of the thesis 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to the evaluation of humanitarian aid by making the 
gap in current evaluation frameworks smaller. To do this, this thesis applies Allan 
McConnell’s theory for evaluating policy and crisis management to the case of Korea’s 
response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake which has been already measured by the Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (DAC-
OECD) criteria (ALNAP, 2006; DAC-OECD, 1999), the most commonly used evaluation 
framework in the humanitarian sector. The focus of the thesis is the examination of the 
applicability of an alternative to the orthodoxy of humanitarian evaluation, the DAC-OECD 
criteria, specifically the validity and scope conditions of McConnell’s approach for 
evaluating humanitarian aid policy. Based on the researcher’s experience and McConnell’s 
arguments of evaluation, the thesis investigates three different aspects of Korea’s response in 
Haiti and then determines the degree of success or failure of each aspect.  
 
In 2011, an evaluation team, including the researcher, met many difficulties in humanitarian 
evaluation when it conducted an assessment on the case of Korea’s response to the 2010 Haiti 
earthquake using the DAC-OECD criteria. The team, sponsored by the Korean Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) and the Korea International Cooperation Agency 
(KOICA), applied the DAC-OECD criteria of efficiency, effectiveness, impact, 
relevance/appropriateness, coherence, connectedness, and coverage to the case  (KOICA, 
2011a). The team assessed the response in three different domains: system, preparedness and 
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response, considering the focus of evaluation from policy level to project level (Gasper, 2000; 
KOICA, 2011a). The two domains of preparedness and response were further divided into 
three technical parts: search and rescue, medical support, and logistics, in order to complete a 
systematic evaluation. With this evaluation, it was hoped to learn from past experiences and 
improve Korea’s overseas emergency response. Furthermore, the response dimension was 
subdivided into three steps: mobilization, operation, and demobilization with the flow of time 
(KOICA, 2011a). These divisions were made for an analytical purpose so as to understand 
the nature of different aspects of the response. However, during the evaluation, the team 
confronted a significant challenge in applying the DAC-OECD criteria as the evaluation 
framework for the case. The framework missed out some important factors, for example, 
there was no mention of the political dimensions of humanitarian aid policy. There were also 
difficulties in determining the degree of success and/or failure of the response due to the 
absence of guidance in this respect. Moreover, the team found it difficult to understand how 
to apply some of the criteria. Indeed, some criteria were so generic that they were deemed not 
suitable to use in this case.  
 
In view of these experiences, the thesis seeks to examine again Korea’s response to the 2010 
Haiti earthquake by employing McConnell’s framework. His framework may help expand the 
scope of evaluation and deal more systematically with the degree of success and/or failure of 
the response by looking at it in three dimensions. By doing this, it is hoped that this thesis 
will make the gaps in current approaches, mentioned above, smaller. McConnell’s theory 
includes the political aspects of policy to assess the nature of political success or failure. His 
theory also clarifies the definitions of policy success and failure by combining facts and 
perceptions in order to identify goal achievement and to accommodate the issue of success 
for whom (McConnell, 2010a). The theory further provides a set of standards for the 
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evaluation of project and programme success or failure, as well as a continuum of five levels 
of classification: success, durable success, conflicted success, precarious success, and failure, 
so as to distinguish intermediate levels between success and failure (McConnell, 2010b). The 
thesis adopts case study methodology in order to “assess the validity and scope conditions of 
single or competing theories” (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 74) because the case of Korea’s 
response had been already measure by other evaluation theory, the DAC-OECD criteria, as 
mentioned above. Single-case studies might thus be useful “if they pose a “tough test” for 
theories or identify alternative causal paths to similar outcomes when equifinality is present” 
(George & Bennett, 2005, p. 74), even though single-case studies have been criticised by 
some scholars because they do not vary in their dependent variables. Considering this 
argument, the research examines the case study of McConnell’s theory to see if it may be a 
useful tool for us to assess humanitarian action, because it can afford to determine the degrees 
of success or failure in different dimensions of policy. 
 
1.2 Is the orthodoxy of humanitarian evaluation adequate?  
 
This section seeks to link this thesis with previous scholarly works to identify and investigate 
related literature on humanitarian evaluation. It will thus explore from the general problems 
of policy analysis, focusing on evaluation approaches, to the specific difficulties of 
humanitarian evaluation, focusing on the DAC-OECD criteria, and then examine the 
significance and issues of evaluating humanitarian aid policy. Finally, it will reveal the gap 
that exists in current frameworks for humanitarian evaluation, and then argue that the 
orthodoxy of humanitarian evaluation is inadequate, and finally present the research question 
to be answered. 
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The discussion on what is policy closely relates to the approaches for policy analysis  
(Fischer & Forester, 1993; Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002; McConnell, 2010a). The traditional 
perspective of policy science posits policy as authoritative decision making, straightforward 
formulation and problem solving in view of the theoretical approach to rational policy 
making, but alternative perspectives highlight the competitive struggle for the right to choose 
and a political perspective in the light of real or practical approaches (Colebatch, 2006). The 
traditional perspective of policy science argues that “Governments recognize problems and 
make decisions to bring public authority and resources to bear upon these problems” 
(Colebatch, Hoppe, & Noordegraaf, 2010). From this perspective, Dye (2005, p. 1) describes 
public policy as “whatever government chose to do or not to do”. In contrast, alternative 
perspectives argue that policy has the characteristics of interest negotiation, process 
interaction and interpretation: Colebatch (2006, p. 14), for example, notes “policy is a 
collective process of managing interpretation across a range of fields of activity”. Even 
though the traditional perspective takes the centre stage of policy debate, this perspective 
raises questions for both practitioners and scholars, and alternative perspectives are thus more 
highlighted by policy study literature (Colebatch et al., 2010).  
 
Different approaches for policy analysis also exist in the base of norms, values and interests 
(Bovens, Hart, & Kuipers, 2006). In the rational perspective, Dye (2011, p. 4) defines policy 
analysis as “finding out what governments do, why they do it, and what difference, if any, it 
makes” in order to bring out description, causes and consequences of public policy. Dye  
(2011, p. 323) further defines policy evaluation as “learning about the consequences of public 
policy”. Evaluation is conducted after implementing policies and it can thus discover what 
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was done and what was not done and may thus entail “policy refinements, policy 
improvements and policy learning” (McConnell, 2010a, p. 11). The rational approach 
suggests value neutrality of policy analysis and objective evaluation of policy implementation 
in view of scientific and positivistic perspectives (Dunn, 2004). On the other hand, the 
argumentative approach, in consideration of the post-positivist or discourse analysis, 
maintains evaluation as a debate between relevant interests (Fischer, 1998; Majone, 1989). 
Furthermore, Bovens et al. (2006, p. 319), so-called revisionist approach, argue that “policy 
evaluation is an inherently normative act, a matter of political judgement” from an opposite 
perspective of the rational approach. The revisionist approach also argues that it is difficult to 
come to only one substantive or at any rate consensual assessment of a policy and to extract 
definite lessons from evaluation because the methodology and results of evaluating a policy 
are widely varied (Bovens et al., 2006). Therefore, the selection of an evaluation framework 
depends on the different sets of what should be measured and this makes evaluation more 
difficult.  
 
In relation to the above arguments, the evaluation of humanitarian assistance has many issues. 
Humanitarian aid can be defined in many different ways, and the Good Humanitarian 
Donorship initiative, for example, describes it as “to save lives, alleviate suffering and 
maintain human dignity during and in the aftermath of man-made crises and natural disasters, 
as well as to prevent and strengthen preparedness for the occurrence of such situations” 
(according to its own website at www.goodhumanitariandonorship.org). Evaluation of 
humanitarian action can perhaps best be defined as “a systematic and impartial examination 
of humanitarian action intended to draw lessons to improve policy and practice and to 
enhance accountability” (ALNAP, 2006, p. 14). Such an examination will assess policy or 
programme with matching appropriate criteria, produce findings or conclusions, and add 
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recommendations for improving humanitarian relief (Buchana-Smith & Telford, 2007). The 
evaluation of humanitarian aid is essential to measure the effect of response to disasters or 
crises as well as to foster the progress of policy or project regarding such responses. To do 
this, evaluators employ a number of different evaluation initiatives which are suitable to their 
evaluation orientation or context, such as peer review, codes of conduct and certification and 
there is also some overlap. Though each initiative is proper to a certain extent in each case, 
they are not mutually exclusive and should all be considered (Buchana-Smith & Telford, 
2007).  
 
In disaster relief literature, there is also a lot of critical discussion that points out the problems 
of the application of current initiatives of humanitarian evaluation. In relation to the DAC-
OECD criteria, which is the most widely used evaluation framework in the humanitarian field, 
Frerks and Hilhorst  (2002) question whether the availability of the criteria in the context of 
humanitarian crises is of any substantial use because humanitarian actions are often 
formulated in a contemporary response with little documentation. They also criticise the 
limitations of the criteria, for example, efficiency has the issue of suitability owing to the 
reluctance to quantify the saving of lives in economic terms and the inclination to employ 
cost/benefit analyses to life-saving actions. Impact and sustainability are also problematic 
because of the limited extent of the objectives and the relatively short time period involved 
and the ad-hoc nature of the implementation of humanitarian assistance (Frerks & Hilhorst, 
2002). Moreover, the meaning of some of the DAC-OECD criteria is difficult to understand, 
and their usage is thus employed mechanically in many cases (ALNAP, 2006). Oliver (2008) 
has further suggested that evaluators could not easily deal with complicated or contextual 
aspects because the criteria are so generic that they are not properly suited to each case. The 
Red Cross Codes of Conduct (IFRC, 1995) , which is self-regulated by the signatories, is 
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another initiative for evaluating humanitarian assistance. It has been criticized because it 
chiefly assesses humanitarian action by regarding a set of image and judgement not by an 
objective evaluation and this often happens because of a lack of instruments of compliance 
within the code (DEC, 2001). Oliver (2008) also maintained that the Codes of Conduct is not 
an assessment standard but a norm of action, and Hilhorst (2002) further claimed that the 
code does not provide measures in relation to humanitarian actions. Furthermore, the Sphere 
Project (2011), which seeks to build minimum standards in the humanitarian sector through 
the rights-based approach, has been questioned because of an insufficient perception of the 
political dimension in the humanitarian context (Hilhorst, 2002),  and O’Donnell et al (2002) 
also argued that the project is so extensive that it does not easily adapt to a particular situation. 
In consideration of these arguments, the evaluation of humanitarian aid may be more difficult 
than the general evaluation of policy.  
 
The increasing interest in the evaluation of humanitarian action shows the importance of the 
impact of humanitarian assistance. Due to the increase of natural disasters and other 
emergencies in the twenty-first century, humanitarian response has needed to expand its 
capacity and ability to deal effectively with the saving of lives and promoting the well-being 
of the population affected by disasters, such as earthquakes, tsunamis, cyclones or other 
crises. To keep pace with these circumstances, many diverse humanitarian actors, such as 
public sector, private sector and international organizations, endeavour to assist the affected 
countries or regions by cooperation with other countries, Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs), the United Nations (UN) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies (IFRC). A great amount of humanitarian assistance, including huge 
amounts of human resources and aid money, has in the past been raised to help the affected 
population on behalf of humanitarianism, after natural disasters or crises. The number of 
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humanitarian actors and the scope of their activities has significantly expanded due to the 
increase in humanitarian emergencies, specifically after the beginning of the 1990s (Hilhorst, 
2002). The total amount of humanitarian assistance from the DAC-OECD donors has also 
increased dramatically during this time. Worldwide expenditure on humanitarian crises 
reached an average of over US$5 billion a year in the 1990s which doubled the US$2 billion 
average of the 1980s (GHA, 2008). In 2004, it stood at US$6.5 billion mainly due to the 
Indian Ocean earthquake/tsunami and the South Asia (Kashmir) earthquake, and it then 
increased to US$10.8 billion in 2005. In 2008, it continued to grow and reached US$11.5 
billion chiefly because of the global food price crisis, cyclones affecting Myanmar and 
Bangladesh and the Sichuan earthquake in China. Furthermore, in 2010 big natural disasters, 
such as the Haiti earthquake and the Pakistan floods, caused the total humanitarian 
expenditure from the DAC-OECD members to reach US$12.3 billion, recorded as the highest 
amount in history (GHA, 2012). Despite these increases, humanitarian assistance might be 
susceptible to the problem of some affected nations being less able to respond to crises, 
concurrent with the problem of the affected population becoming less adaptable to the impact 
of disasters. This means humanitarian assistance is less able to focus on dealing with 
humanitarian crises. Also, with the constraints of aid resources, including human and 
financial, the effective delivery of humanitarian services is strongly demanded to save lives 
and mitigate the suffering of the affected population. These environments offer an impetus to 
the debate on the evaluation of humanitarian aid. 
 
The issue of humanitarian evaluation is more important to the public sector, which is 
responsible for an aid budget and has to meet national expectations, than to others, and 
evaluating aid policy has thus become more and more highlighted in the humanitarian field 
(Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002). After the responses to the 2004 Asian tsunami and the 2010 Haiti 
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earthquake, the international humanitarian community provided an outpouring of literature on 
humanitarian evaluation for measuring a policy or program (Oliver, 2008). These evaluations 
of humanitarian aid mainly emphasised furnishing progressive implementation. Many 
countries have also conducted humanitarian evaluation to seek policy amendment and to 
ameliorate their response to the next case, after providing various kinds of emergency relief, 
for example, supplying relief goods, saving lives and helping recovery and rehabilitation. A 
significant function of these evaluations may be to foster the improvement of aid policy in 
order to do humanitarianism more efficaciously. These relief activities are closely related to 
each country’s legal framework because aid policies are a part of each government’s foreign 
policy. Tremblay et al. (2010) and KOICA (2011a), for example, assessed Australia’s 
response  and Korea’s response to the Haiti earthquake by employing the DAC-OECD 
criteria, a current orthodoxy of humanitarian evaluation. The results, however, failed to 
involve political aspects of their responses and assessed only the operational level, excluding 
the strategic level of their humanitarian policies. They also did not determine how successful 
the responses were due to the limitations of the DAC-OECD framework. In view of these 
circumstances, humanitarian aid policy, composing both a strategic level which legitimises 
the planning of humanitarian relief and an operational level which performs relief, has the 
characteristics of humanitarian action as well as public policy, and this peculiarity 
exacerbates the difficulty of evaluating humanitarian aid policy. However, even though a lot 
of humanitarian evaluation papers have been published, there is not much literature which 
deals appropriately with the features and the necessity of evaluating humanitarian aid policy 
(Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002), and this thus opens room for discussion on the issue. 
 
In consideration of the above issues, McConnell’s theory actively engages the general issues 
of policy analysis: how to involve political aspects of policy and how to determine the degree 
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of success or failure. It also tackles the executive problems of humanitarian evaluation: how 
to deal with the context of humanitarian crises and how to assess the operational as well as 
strategic levels of project or programme. By dividing a policy into three different dimensions: 
process, programme and politics, McConnell’s theory can elucidate the ways in which 
success and failure might be made clear among these dimensions (McConnell, 2010b). It also 
provides a definition of policy success and failure by a pragmatic mixture of a fact, in view of 
the rational approach and interpretation, in light of the argumentative approach. In addition, 
the theory provides detailed assessment criteria for each dimension which evaluators can use 
to help in assessment (McConnell, 2010a). Moreover, the theory displays five levels of 
classification: success, durable success, conflicted success, precarious success and failure, 
allowing the determination of the degrees of success and/or failure in the three dimensions 
(McConnnell, 2011). Therefore, his theory involves the political dimension of policy, which 
is a shortcoming of the DAC-OECD framework, as well as the rational approach for policy 
analysis, by analysing three different dimensions of policy. Evaluators can also easily identify 
success and/or failure of policy implementation by using McConnell’s evaluation criteria, and 
further determine the degrees of success and/or failure by using a continuum from success to 
failure, which may mitigate the limitations of the current frameworks of humanitarian 
evaluation and the argumentative approach for policy analysis. McConnell’s theory will thus 
overcome to a large context the deficiencies of the current approaches for policy analysis as 
well as the frameworks for humanitarian evaluation. 
 
In view of the above, this thesis aims to contribute to the efforts of dealing with the 
evaluation of humanitarian aid through the application of McConnell’s theory in the case 
study of Korea’s response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake. The thesis will look at policy making, 
the practice of humanitarian relief and the politics of overseas emergency response so as to 
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make the gaps in the current approaches smaller. To do this, the study proposes the following 
research question:  
To what extent can Korea’s response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake be described as successful? 
 
1.3 Understanding the case of Korea’s response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake 
 
The 2010 Haiti earthquake has been recorded as one of the most catastrophic events in the 
history of natural disasters and resulted in many evaluation papers. It affected about 3 million 
people including the death of over 220,000 people and the injury of 300,000 more and 
generated substantial assistance from the humanitarian community (Rencort, Stoddard, Haver, 
Taylor, & Harvey, 2010). During and after the relief and recovery activities, many evaluation 
papers relevant to the disaster were written to measure response systems and to assess the 
impacts of aid at the scene. In the evaluation of humanitarian response to the Haiti earthquake, 
the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) and 
other humanitarian actors reviewed their activities by employing the DAC-OECD criteria 
(Bhattacharjee & Lossio, 2011; IASC, 2010; KOICA, 2011a; Taylor, Gowthaman, Sanford, 
& Hurst, 2010). In addition to that criteria, Taylor et al. (2010) involved gender equality and 
the question of whether Australia’s response met the accountability and minimum standards 
of humanitarian aid, and the reports of the Active Learning Network for Accountability and 
Performance (ALNAP) (Bhattacharjee & Lossio, 2011; Patrick, 2011) also added 
coordination and timeliness in their assessment, so as to do a more comprehensive evaluation 
practice and to enable a better focus on the overall context (Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002). 
Tremblay (2010) further tried participatory action research in his study, analysing the 
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development of a UN coordination system in humanitarian response to the Haiti earthquake, 
so as to elucidate useful knowledge for providing greater understanding of management and 
coordination systems for future humanitarian responses. His research applied this 
methodology for the sake of encouraging local, national and international actors to become 
actively involved in the ongoing study, thus contributing to better comprehension of the 
different interests and objectives of indigenous actors. Many of the relevant literature call for 
an increase in evaluation criteria, however it must be kept in mind that the addition of some 
criteria makes evaluation and the selection of criteria instruments more complicated and 
obscure (Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002).  
 
Like Australia, Korea also supported humanitarian assistance to Haiti and then evaluated the 
case by using the DAC-OECD criteria. The Korean government supplied a total of US$10 
million for aid to Haiti, but the use of the first $1 million of this money constructs the main 
core of this research and it was all assigned for humanitarian relief. The money was allocated 
as follows: US$200,000 for medicine and medical support and US$800,000 for the dispatch 
of Korea Disaster Relief (KDR) teams (Jeong & Park, 2010b). The Haiti response by Korea 
is the first combined response by a rescue team and a medical team because Korea’s relief for 
the 2008 China earthquake was implemented by only a rescue team and the 2008 Myanmar 
cyclone was attended only by a medical team. The Haiti case thus better serves to review the 
overall structure of the Korean humanitarian response system as a whole, because it also 
includes the public-private partnership, the Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) of Korea and the 
use of military assets in humanitarian relief. In addition, an evaluation team, including the 
researcher, sponsored by MOFAT and KOICA, assessed the response by applying the DAC-
OECD criteria for the improvement of its system. This research can thus afford to analyse the 
strengths and weaknesses of each framework by comparing the results of its evaluation, both 
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the DAC-OECD criteria and McConnell’s approach. Furthermore, the response to the Haiti 
earthquake served as an impetus for Korea to reform its system of overseas emergency 
response. Korea amended both the Overseas Emergency Relief Act (Government of the 
Republic of Korea, 2007) and its enforcement decree in 2011. It has thus established various 
plans, for example, the Plan for the Advancement of Overseas Emergency Relief (MOFAT, 
2010) and the KOICA Implementation Plan for Partnership with Civil Society in the 
Humanitarian Assistance Sector (KOICA, 2011b),  so as to improve its response capacity for 
the realization of humanitarianism. Moreover, many papers, such as KOICA (2011a), Lee et 
al. (2012), Hong (2010), found that the Haiti case serves as a good exemplary among cases of 
assisting in overseas emergencies, and also pointed out that Korea contributed to the 
earthquake relief to some extent but needed to supply more resources and to further utilize 
preferable existent ways to enlarge its competence to respond. Therefore, considering the 
argument of George and Bennett (2005, p. 80), “Single cases serve the purpose of theory 
testing particularly well if they are “most-likely,” “ least-likely,” or “crucial” cases”, Korea’s 
response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake as a crucial case may be suitable to explore 
McConnell’s theory of evaluating humanitarian action because it provides a good opportunity 
to investigate almost all aspects of humanitarian aid policy due to its corporate response and 
self-reflection for policy reform. The case study can also be used to compare the advantages 
and disadvantages of the orthodoxy of humanitarian evaluation, the DAC-OECD criteria, and 
an alternative, McConnell’s framework, by analysing the results of each framework. 
 
This study applies McConnell’s approach as the evaluation framework for this case study so 
as to challenge existing approaches to humanitarian evaluation. McConnell’s framework 
provides a useful tool for evaluation by expanding the scope of assessment, especially the 
evaluation of political aspects and by determining the degree of success or failure of policy. 
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His framework assesses three different aspects of policy: process, program and politics. 
These three aspects are not mutually exclusive but may overlap to a degree, but for the sake 
of analysis may be considered individually (McConnell, 2010a, 2010b; McConnnell, 2011). 
The framework may thus compensate the flaws of the DAC-OECD criteria by involving a 
political aspect. The main assessment for this research also applies McConnell’s five grades 
of success or failure: success, durable success, conflicted success, precarious success and 
failure, for determining the degrees of success or failure in three aspects of policy or project 
which can also help make up for the weak points of the current approaches for humanitarian 
evaluation. Moreover, the framework proffers a set of evaluation criteria for analysing and 
classifying levels of success or failure across the process, program and political aspects 
within a policy. Therefore, it may provide a useful measure for assessment and become a 
useful tool for evaluators in revealing success and/or failure among different dimensions of 
policy as well as helping to explain some peculiarities or dynamics of policy through the 
relationships between these dimensions of policy (McConnell, 2010a, 2010b; McConnnell, 
2011).  
 
This study utilizes three different areas of data by employing a mixed methods, the 
combination of quantitative methods and qualitative methods. The method helps to reveal the 
circumstances of decision making, operational activities and political complexity within a 
policy by using a document review of the operational as well as strategic levels, and 
interviews with actors and stakeholders (European Commission, 2007). The first of these area 
of data is an extensive document review using both internal and external documents, reports 
and literature on the Haiti response, as well as Korea’s legal framework and structures related 
to this case. The second is two focus group interviews and a number of individual in-depth 
key informant interviews. The focus group interviews were conducted, respectively, with 
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rescue staff and medical staff who participated in the Haiti operations, and the interviewees 
gave their opinion of Korea’s response to the Haiti earthquake. The key informant interviews 
were conducted with domestic personnel who had the responsibility of emergency response 
in agencies relevant to the Haiti response, as well as international personnel who were 
officials in Haiti and the staff of international organizations. The third is an online survey 
which investigated the essentials for strengthening the medical staff of emergency relief 
teams. The survey conducted a total number of 180 online surveys to garner the perceptions 
and motivation of the overseas emergency relief activities from the members of the Korea 
Academy of Disaster Medicine, mainly composed of emergency medical personnel, and the 
National Disaster Life Support. The interviews and online survey were conducted in 2011 in 
Korea in compliance with an ethical review approved by the Seoul National University. All 
data and materials used in this thesis were again approved by the Humanities Low Risk 
Subcommittee, The University of Sydney in July, 2013. 
 
1.4 Significance and limitations of this thesis 
 
This study is significant because it explores a theory for humanitarian evaluation which has 
not been previously tested, so as to alleviate the shortcomings of existing approaches. Using 
the case study of Korea’s response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake, this thesis will examine the 
validity of an alternative approach, McConnell’s theory, to the orthodox approach, the DAC-
OECD criteria, for humanitarian evaluation, by following McConnell’s approach and by 
investigating the possible reasons for success or failure with respect to the evaluation criteria. 
It is important to the governments and population of countries affected by disasters as well as 
to the governments of donor countries to know whether humanitarian aid is a success or 
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failure (Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002). In addition, a wider understanding of how and why 
humanitarian aid policies perform successfully (or why they do not) can help countries to 
respond more efficiently to recipients’ needs and to more effectively reach their goals. 
Furthermore, the analysis on and refinement of a country’s emergency relief system and 
relevant policy are imperative because each country is expected to contribute more and more 
to the international humanitarian community in accordance with the increase in the 
occurrence of large-scale natural disasters and the growing demand for humanitarian relief 
activities. However, the study of humanitarian aid policy has lagged behind other parts of the 
relevant studies such as the dialogue of development,  though it has been more highlighted in 
the field of evaluation literature (Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002). Therefore, this thesis intends to 
fill the gap in the literature relevant to evaluating humanitarian policy. 
 
This research has limitations in dealing with the case of Korea’s response to the Haiti 
earthquake. It focuses on Korea’s response system, response operations and governmental 
directions, such as the dispatch of KDR teams, not on emergency relief goods and post-
disaster reconstruction. Also, the private sector of Korea’s assistance is not included because 
of its characteristic difference. Moreover, it seems that the results of the evaluation may not 
be easily applied to other countries’ aid policies or programmes due to their different 
environments or contexts; nevertheless, their response policies and challenges might be 
germane to other systems or architectures employed in similar actions. Though the rationale 
for the research design does not include all other cases comprehensively, the study sets a 
good example for evaluating humanitarian aid policy, and this may be closely related to the 
evaluation of other countries’ humanitarian policies. The research further supposes that the 
selected focus group interviewees are a true representation of the rescue and medical staff 
who participated in the Haitian operations.  
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As a previous National 119 Rescue Services of Korea (NRS) team member as well as Korea 
Search and Rescue (KOSAR) team member, the researcher may have the inclination to doubt 
of the efficacy of the Korean aid policy, specifically due to the KDR team’s shortcomings 
and excessive red tape. Even if the researcher was cautious to adopt conditions free from 
these kinds of predisposition, he exposes the risk of inadvertently biasing the research 
findings with his prior view. He has endeavoured to conduct the data analysis from an 
objective viewpoint when he has encountered any chance of neglecting important points 
because of his tendency to be biased as a civil servant for the Korean government. 
 
1.5 Thesis outline 
 
To answer the research question raised in this study, this thesis is composed of seven chapters, 
with Chapter One being the Introduction. Chapter Two will review the literature of policy 
analysis, humanitarian evaluation and a new theory of evaluation. Chapter Three will explain 
the methodology used in this study. Chapter Four will be an evaluation of the process 
dimension of the Korea’s response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake by applying McConnell’s 
criteria for the examination of the legal framework and the architecture of overseas 
emergency relief. Chapter Five will also be an assessment of the programme dimension of the 
Korea’s response by employing McConnell’s standards for the analysis of the operations and 
activities of the KDR teams. Chapter Six will furthermore be an evaluation of the political 
dimension of the response by using his measures for the exploration of the policy agenda of 
humanitarian relief and the governmental direction of the policy. Finally, Chapter Seven will 
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discuss the findings of this research project and the contradictions between different forms of 
success and/or failure in relation to the three dimensions of the policy and then come to a 
conclusion. 
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Chapter 2 – Understanding Evaluation: From Policy Analysis to Humanitarian Aid 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter has tried to outline and explain the motivation for this research of 
evaluating humanitarian response. This chapter aims to connect this thesis with prior 
scholarly efforts so as to identify and explore relevant literature. Even though the evaluation 
of humanitarian action is important to donors, the population affected by disasters and other 
stakeholders, by its nature humanitarian action is problematic to evaluate because disasters or 
crises entail intrinsically great uncertainty and variation, such relief work is put into practice 
under dangerous situations, and political intervention in the arena of humanitarian assistance 
entails enormous resources (ALNAP, 2006; Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002; Oliver, 2008). 
Therefore, a review of the issues of policy analysis and the initiatives of humanitarian 
evaluation is valuable to draw out a new approach for evaluation so as to make the gap in 
current evaluation frameworks smaller.  
 
This review has four principal sections. The first explores the arguments related to different 
approaches to policy analysis based on various questions and issues. The second explains the 
significance and difficulties of the evaluation of humanitarian aid and also points out the 
features and restrictions of major existing initiatives of humanitarian evaluation with the help 
of a useful taxonomy, as suggested by Hilhorst (2002) as a classification of evaluation 
initiatives for humanitarian action. The third investigates the applicability of the employment 
of a new approach in the evaluation of humanitarian aid. The last section reveals the 
deficiencies in prior research that this thesis intends to mitigate. 
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2.2 Policy analysis 
 
The context of what is policy closely relates to the debate on policy analysis approaches 
(Fischer & Forester, 1993; Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002; McConnell, 2010a). Dror (1968, p. 14) in 
view on the traditional perspective of policy science  notes that policy “lays down general 
directives, rather than detailed instructions, on the main lines of action to be followed”. This 
notion implies that policy is a theoretical action plan decided upon before taking action to 
achieve certain goals in the public and private sectors. In relation to this view, Dye (2005, p. 
1) further notes public policy as “whatever government chose to do or not to do”. This means 
that public policy is a principle determined by the government, and puts into play guidelines 
for decision-making, performance, and quality control of project or programme. However, 
policy cannot be easily differentiated from program, practice and other realms of policy 
performance. Policy has the nature of interaction; Colebatch (2006, p. 14), for example, notes 
that “policy is a collective process of managing interpretation across a range of fields of 
activity”. The traditional perspective of policy science emphasises problem solving and 
authoritative, instrumental terms of policy; on the contrary, alternative perspectives highlight 
the competitive struggle for the right to choose and a political approach to policy analysis 
(Colebatch et al., 2010). The traditional perspective suggests policy to be authoritative 
decision making and straightforward formulation in the current pattern of governing, in view 
of the theoretical approach to rational policy making; while, alternative perspectives highlight 
the aspects of interest negotiation and structured interaction of policy processes and 
interpretation, and multiple perspectives in the light of a real or practical approach (Colebatch, 
2006).  
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Considering the above arguments, Bovens et al. (2006) categorise three different evaluation 
approaches: rationalist and argumentativist, with regard to norms, values and interests, and 
then propose a so-called revisionist approach so as to challenge the limitations of both 
approaches. The rational approach, as an extension of the traditional perspective, claims 
value neutrality and intends to keep evaluation from the influence of politics and objective 
evaluation of policy implementation. On the contrary, the argumentative approach, as an 
extension of alternative perspectives, maintains evaluation as a debate among related interests 
and thus involves politics of policy. The revisionist approach thus argues that “policy 
evaluation is an inherently normative act, a matter of political judgement” (Fischer & 
Forester, 1993, p. 319). 
 
2.2.1 Rational approach 
 
The rational approach, as a scientific, positivistic and quantitative methodology in the same 
context as the rational tradition of policy science, was dominant in the past and still currently 
plays an important role, though it has been increasingly criticised by many different 
alternatives. The positivistic perspective of the rational approach regards evaluation as an 
essential part of the policy process, and the assessment of performance is measured by fixed 
goals, with the necessary data collected in prescribed ways and by applying established 
criteria (Bovens et al., 2006; Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002).  Policy analysis in the rational 
approach maintains a division of facts and values, apolitical and quantitative evaluation of 
policy execution, the provision of factual information of societal architecture and procedures 
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using scientific methodology, and the contribution of decision making to the policy process. 
Considered apart from the contexts of psychology, culture and linguistics, practical 
information, because of its premise of political and moral neutrality, is the basis of decision 
making for a project’s effectiveness and efficiency. The rational approach also has the 
assumption of predefined policy goals and evaluation criteria and established parameters to 
assess the accomplishment of fixed objectives (Bovens et al., 2006). The positivistic 
perspective claims that it can provide an optimum of theoretical policy  and can assess the 
difference between the anticipated results and the actual results of policy by evaluation (Dunn, 
2004). Bovens et al. (2006) explain that the Organizations for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) uses a rationalist approach with its institutional objectives, for 
example, to seek policy improvement for social and economic development in the world and 
to build international standards for various fields. The OECD’s peer reviews or country 
reports, which have got to some extent authority, and its established reviews and mutual 
examination by governments, are regarded as a judgement on national policy implementation 
(OECD, 2013). As Marsden and Oakley (1991) have noted, as an instrumental/technocratic 
approach, the positivist perspective is a constant learning process where evaluations provide 
lessons learned that give feedback in the policy process and this knowledge is thus combined 
in future projects, and this involves a scientific process of administrative-bureaucratic theory.  
 
However, the argumentative approach, as an alternative to the rational perspective, asserts 
that it is difficult to differentiate between fact and value because policy implementation is an 
intrinsically value-laden activity in regard to its social and political aspects (Guba & Lincoln, 
1989; Majone, 1989). Participatory and stakeholder approaches further argue for the 
involvement of multiple interests, perceptions and interpretations rather than one-sided 
evaluation.  Stakeholders include decision makers, executive organisations, recipients and 
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other actors involved in the project, and a participatory approach thus highlights the 
identification of the goals, processes, outcomes and results in all stakeholders’ participation. 
The rational approach has also been criticised as managerialism in which managers and 
evaluators are commissioned, and this disempowers the other stakeholders (Frerks & Hilhorst, 
2002). 
 
2.2.2 Argumentative approach 
 
The argumentative approach asserts that it is impossible for us to divide values into facts and 
also impossible to separate politics and science and further insists on the active engagement 
of policy analysis in the discussion on values in decision making (Bovens & t' Hart, 1996; 
Fischer, 1998; Majone, 1989). The post-positivist or discourse analysis emphasises the 
differential interpretations and meanings of actors, the relationship between knowledge and 
power,  and the separation of open and underlying assumptions and values of project and 
implementation (Fischer, 1998; Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002). Fischer (1998), for example, 
criticised the first assessment of the Head Start Program as a short-term cost-benefit analysis 
because it failed to measure the long-term outcomes of the program and thus contributed to 
supporting the Nixon administration by befitting the position of the administrative which 
sought to dramatically reduce the program. In addition, the standardized comparison of terms 
and numbers has much room for interpretation and often causes controversy. Bovens et al. 
(2006) also pointed out the discrepancy between the 8 per cent figure in the OECD’s report 
and the 23.5 per cent figure in the Belgian agency’s report regarding the Belgian 
unemployment rate was due to different notions of what constituted employment. The 
argumentative approach thus criticises the pragmatic perspective of the rational approach 
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because it considers only decision making in the policy process, and further criticises the 
rational approach because of the poor recognition of the political aspects of policy (Barry & 
Rae, 1975; Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002; Stone, 1997). 
 
The argumentative approach highlights the political aspects of policy and evaluation (Barry 
& Rae, 1975; Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002). This approach argues that policies or programmes are 
influenced by societies and interpreted by actors’ experience and interests. The approach 
further maintains that scientific evaluation can’t easily comprehend “social, political and 
value-oriented character” (Guba & Lincoln, 1989, pp. 7-8), even though the positivistic 
perspective claims that it can know the reality of programmes and that these programmes are 
formulated rationally. The argumentative approach emphasises the issue of evaluation for 
whom which is closely related to the politics of policy evaluation. If evaluation is dominated 
by some actors’ interests and interpretation in the design and control of evaluation activities, 
other actors’ interests and voices are ignored. Some of the argumentative perspective thus 
maintains that policy evaluation has to incorporate the interpretation, meaning and interests 
of both dominant groups and under-represented groups in order to encompass everyone’s 
experiences and interpretation as stakeholders of policy(Barry & Rae, 1975) (Fischer, 1998; 
Fischer & Forester, 1993). The argumentative approach thus suggests the consideration of 
multiple actors who participate in programs or projects and have their own interests and 
further compete in achieving goals (Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002; Stone, 1997). Long (1997), for 
example, emphasises social construction through competition and negotiation of values and 
interests. The argumentative approach asserts that policy interference, considering social and 
political circumstances, has the meaning of value and norm which lends itself to value-
oriented evaluation (Fischer & Forester, 1993; Guba & Lincoln, 1989). However, Bovens et 
al. (2006) are critical that the argumentative approach including social constructivists do not 
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provide any guidelines that allows policy analysts to navigate the political arena of policy, 
even though they clearly point out the political realms of policy evaluation.  
 
2.2.3 Revisionist approach 
 
Bovens et al. (2006), so-called revisionist approach to policy analysis, present an outstanding 
view of how to deal with the norm, methodology and politics of policy evaluation. They 
highlight the nature of norm and the politics of policy analysis in the same context of 
argumentative approach, and argue that evaluation will have a political nature from the 
opposite perspective of the rational approach, and also has to involve winners and losers, 
even if it seems a typical or non-questionable policy evaluation. All policies, even 
technocratic and non-significant ones, incorporate various actors, such as decision makers, 
administrative organizations, recipients and interest groups, who have their own interests in 
the result of the evaluation. Evaluation can thus bring about the restructure of policy basis 
and goals, revise the combination of tools it depends on, and redistribute the allocation of 
relevant resources among the multiple stakeholders related to its execution (Bovens et al., 
2006). The revisionist approach is rooted in an incrementalist viewpoint which advocates that 
one of the most important missions of policy makers is to make an effort to solve social 
problems through an open and pluralist discussion (Lindblom, 1990). Considering how to 
solve the problems of both the argumentative approach and the evaluation of politics, they 
argue that evaluators have to manage the problems of both positivism in methodology and 
relativism in the politics of evaluation, and evaluations should have relevance to the policy 
free from the exploitation of the politics of the relevant realm. The revisionist approach 
highlights the context of a new shift in policy science rather than the narrow view of the 
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argumentative approach that is based on restricted information and social construction. 
Therefore, evaluators need to change their perspective from positivistic to pluralistic, and the 
scope of policy evaluation has to be widened (Bovens et al., 2006).  
 
The revisionist approach stresses the separation of the programmatic aspect and the political 
aspect of success and failure in policy execution (Bovens & Peters, 2001). A programmatic 
perspective of policy analysis focuses on the effectiveness and efficiency of the policy 
assessed and mainly concerns social problem solving, which is closely incorporated in the 
rational approach, such as the management of social issues and the provision of reasonable 
and appropriate solutions to social problems (Lasswell, 1971; Lindblom, 1990). These 
include normative and political judgement but mainly focus on an institutional perspective 
regarding policies as an interference in social affairs. The division between programmatic and 
political dimensions of policy has a strong analytical advantage because it clearly shows the 
difference between programmatic and political aspects of policy process. In a study of the 
problem of HIV in the blood supply of both Germany and France, for example, Bovens et al. 
(2006) recognised notable discrepancies between programmatic and political assessments. In 
the case, the two countries’ responses resulted in the same degrees of failure to solve the 
problem but the overall results were much different. In France, this evaluation of failure 
caused serious political issues and legal problems; but in Germany, on the contrary, the 
evaluation did not give rise to any political issues. These kinds of evaluation asymmetries 
challenge “the commensense, “just world” hypothesis that good performance should lead to 
political success, vice versa” (Bovens et al., 2006, p. 332). Therefore, Bovens et al. 
recommend that evaluators search out asymmetries and then elucidate these differences with 
regard to the structural and cultural characteristics of the political architecture and “the 
dynamics of the evaluation process in the cases concerned” (Bovens et al., 2006, p. 332). 
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With respect to the arguments about approaches to evaluation, though the argumentative 
approach has shown the limitations of the rational approach and suggested a considerable 
view that “interpretative, constructivist and actor-oriented approaches” (Frerks & Hilhorst, 
2002, p. 6) easily involve the different social interests of the various actors and reveal the 
political aspects of evaluation , the argumentative approach failed to present a clear and 
convincing evaluation framework or instruments for evaluating political aspects of policy. 
However, the revisionist approach demonstrates the limitations and shortcomings of the 
rational approach and the argumentative approach and then highlights the separation between 
the programmatic and the political realms of policy analysis. It thus proposes that evaluators 
challenge the political dimension of policy evaluation by considering structural and cultural 
contexts of policy (Bovens et al., 2006). 
 
2.3 Evaluation of humanitarian aid 
 
This section explores the problems of the evaluation of humanitarian aid and the strengths 
and shortcomings of the many different initiatives of humanitarian evaluation. The debate on 
the evaluation of humanitarian action shows evidence of increasing interest in the impact of 
humanitarian relief. The necessity of improved humanitarian evaluation has lately been 
highlighted by scholars, practitioners and politicians but it is not easy to put it into practice, 
due to implementation issues. If there are multiple actors involved in implementation, 
effective purposive action will be very difficult to accomplish. In some cases, for example, 
implementation gaps might exist when both the formation of a policy and the implementation 
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of this policy occur in separate layers or levels of hierarchy (Hill & Hupe, 2009). Pressman 
and Wildavsky (1984) also elucidated the possible gap between the intentions of policy 
formations and the outcomes or achievements of a policy by noting that it may be more 
possible for agencies to make a distortion of the original policy goals if there is much room 
for interpretation within a complex inter-institutional context. In view of evaluation, clear 
awareness of what is happening during implementation is vital due to the fact that there is an 
information shortage problem in the initial phase. Also, poor prior assumptions produce many 
uncertainties, and this is aggravated by the time lag that often takes place between plan and 
action. Moreover, unanticipated events often occur when a program is implemented and a 
stakeholders’ recognition is changed, which causes implementation issues and demands a 
formal evaluation system to solve any shortcomings (ALNAP, 2006; Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002; 
Hallam, 1997).  
 
The contextual and substantive issues further make humanitarian evaluation difficult. The 
context of humanitarian crises includes disasters or emergencies, displacement, paralysis of 
state functions, and safety and security problems, and this results in poor data collection from 
the field as well as within organizations (Hallam, 1997). Initial needs-assessment is often 
made with a lack of essential data and under huge time pressure (Pressman & Wildavsky, 
1984). With regard to substantive issues, the uncertainty of the work in the field causes 
objectives to be changed many times and action plans to be adapted. Accordingly, assessment 
against a group of firm objectives and an inflexible action plan is not easy. In addition, the 
difference among crises causes the limitation of data comparability and the applicability of 
instances from one case to the next is not high (Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002). Furthermore, the 
diversity of activities and the influence of the overall context regarding humanitarian 
evaluation means that there is difficulty in establishing the relationship between cause and 
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effect, and thus policy evaluation techniques are needed rather than traditional program 
evaluation techniques (ALNAP, 2006; DAC-OECD, 1999). These circumstances are 
advocated by Frerks and Hilhorst (2002, p. 4) as “the call for evaluation of humanitarian aid 
is young” in view of an institutional viewpoint, and they also argue that “the political nature 
of emergency aid, the role of media, fund raising and image building are difficult to match 
with the idea of an open and public ‘impartial’ and documented evaluation” (2002, p. 4) 
 
There are many different evaluation initiatives for humanitarian aid, and these initiatives may, 
in reality, be partly overlapping, perhaps complementary and sometimes conflicting 
(Buchana-Smith & Telford, 2007; Oliver, 2008). In order to elucidate the features and 
restrictions of the promotion and major current initiatives of humanitarian evaluation, this 
thesis follows the classification of Hilhorst (2002) and the next subsections provide an 
overview of these initiatives. 
 
2.3.1 Peer review 
 
Peer review, described as a systematic investigation and evaluation of the performance of a 
state by other countries (Pagani, 2002), is regarded as a useful way of evaluating 
humanitarian policy or program. It is widely known through the efforts of the Development 
Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(DAC-OECD), a forum for selected OECD member countries to improve cooperation with 
developing countries by providing policy guidance by critically reviewing the policies and 
programmes of each member country once every four or five years (OECD, 2012). The 
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agency employs peer review, standing for rational approach for evaluation, as a tool for 
examining member country’s relief programs and for learning from the experiences of others, 
and also for making recommendations to one another regarding good practice and shared 
objectives (Hilhorst, 2002; Pagani, 2002; Porter & Webb, 2007). The DAC-OECD (1999) has 
published guidelines for humanitarian evaluation in complex emergencies to foster 
performance, accountability and learning. The five major evaluation criteria of the DAC-
OECD: efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability, and relevance, are widely known and 
used in the humanitarian evaluation field (European Commission, 2007). In addition, ALNAP, 
founded in 1997 as a multi-agency learning network, has issued the Evaluating Humanitarian 
Action Using the DAC-OECD Criteria (2006) to guide users through a group of seven criteria: 
relevance/appropriateness, connectedness, coherence, coverage, efficiency, effectiveness and 
impact. In the new group of criteria, appropriateness has replaced relevance, and three new 
criteria of connectedness, coherence, and coverage have been added. Connectedness has 
substituted and expanded the notion of sustainability (European Commission, 2007).  
 
Though ALNAP endeavours to manage quality and to foster learning in the humanitarian 
sector, the application of the evaluation criteria encounters many challenges. The former five 
criteria raise questions and pose limitations regarding their employment in the context of 
humanitarian crises because humanitarian operations are frequently framed in a temporary 
response with little documentation and thus there is a lack of information available to 
evaluators (ALNAP, 2006; Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002; Oliver, 2008). Not having sufficient 
definite objectives causes the effectiveness of the criterion to be doubtful, and the limited 
extent of the objectives and the relatively short time period involved and the ad-hoc nature of 
the implementation cause impact and sustainability to become irrelevant. Efficiency has the 
problem of appropriateness owing to the unwillingness to represent lives saved in economic 
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terms and the reluctance to employ cost-benefit analyses to life-saving action (Frerks & 
Hilhorst, 2002). Even though adding some criteria can mean a further broadening of 
evaluation, it may also bring other issues, for example, it makes the evaluation practice and 
the choice of instruments more complex and difficult and causes the question of how to 
weigh the importance of the different criteria (Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002). Considering other 
critiques, the meaning of some of the DAC-OECD criteria is difficult to perceive, and their 
usage is applied mechanically in many cases (ALNAP, 2006). Evaluators also could not 
easily deal with complicated or contextual aspects because the criteria are so comprehensive 
that they are not properly suited to them (Oliver, 2008). In addition, Frerks and Hilhorst 
(2002) argue that the application of the criteria in the context of humanitarian crises has 
limitations because humanitarian actions are often formulated as an immediate response with 
little documentation. Furthermore, using these standards means that there is the added 
difficulty in grasping the idea of the political realm of humanitarian assistance.  
 
2.3.2 Codes of Conduct 
 
The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-
Government Organizations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief, adopted by eight of the largest disaster 
assistance agencies in 1994, is also generally well known. As a voluntary code, which is self-
regulated by the signatories, the Code of Conduct is now engaged by 515 organizations. It is 
based on 10 principles, for example, the humanitarian imperative comes first, and we shall 
endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreign policy (IFRC, 1995), and is 
offered as a guideline for humanitarian assistance. Articles one to four of the code, rooted in 
humanity, impartiality and independence, are major principles of humanitarian relief and 
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emphasise a need-based approach. The code has been applied in humanitarian evaluation as a 
framework by the Disaster Emergency Committee (DEC), an umbrella organization of the 
United Kingdom.  
 
Though the code may be employed as a tool for the evaluation of humanitarian response, it 
mainly measures humanitarian initiatives by considering a collection of impressions and 
judgements, not by an objective assessment, due to insufficient indicators of compliance with 
the code (DEC, 2001). Hilhorst (2005) has suggested that the code does not manifest 
proactive regulations in consideration of humanitarian activities, and Oliver (2008) has also 
criticised that it is not an evaluation standard but a norm of action. The code might be thus 
not a sufficient tool for assessing humanitarian aid due to mentioned above reasons.  
 
2.3.3 The rights approach  
 
The Sphere Project, begun in 1997 as a voluntary and multi-agency initiative, represents the 
rights-based approach to humanitarian relief, and seeks to facilitate the quality and 
accountability of the disaster response. The project has six core minimum standards, 
including people-centred humanitarian response, coordination and collaboration, and 
assessment, as process standards and a group of non-core minimum standards, a qualitative 
statement, that assess the basic sectors of humanitarian response, including water supply, 
sanitation, hygiene, food security, nutrition, shelter, settlement, non-food items and health 
action. It then recommends key actions to achieve the standards,  and provides key indicators 
which are quantitative indexes that reveal whether a standard has been achieved or not by 
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assessing outcomes of key actions (The Sphere Project, 2011). The handbook, The Sphere 
Project: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster (The Sphere Project, 
2011), is a useful measure for managing quality and enhancing accountability of 
humanitarian assistance, and includes both quantitative product parameters and qualitative 
process parameters (Hilhorst, 2002).  
 
As a rights-based approach to humanitarian response, the project emphases the fulfilment of 
human rights, and this contrasts with the needs-based approach of the IFRC Code of Conduct 
and the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) initiative, an informal donor forum and 
network that fosters donors’ activities and their accountability in the humanitarian field by 
developing general principles and good practices (GHD, 2013). The rights-based approach is 
criticized due to the lack of recognition of the political aspect in the humanitarian context 
(Hilhorst, 2002) and, as claimed by O’Donnell et al. (2002), the project could be brought into 
question because it is not specific enough. The approach may thus bring the same problems 
of the DAC-OECD criteria including the difficulty in evaluating politics in humanitarian 
response.  
 
2.3.4 Social audit 
 
The People In Aid, organized by humanitarian and development organizations in 1995, has as 
its main function the social auditing of the humanitarian sector. The network seeks a high 
quality and accountability of human resource management by applying their own code, The 
People In Aid Code of Good Practice (2003). The code details seven principles including 
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human resource strategy, staff policies and practices, and its indicators, for example, “our 
organisational strategy or business plan explicitly values staff for their contribution to 
organisational and operational objectives” (People In Aid, 2003, p. 8) and “staff are 
familiarised with policies and practices that affect them” (People In Aid, 2003, p. 10). This 
gives a framework for improving NGOs’ staff management and it also emphasises doing a 
social audit, which combines the accountability of internal stakeholders with  a method of 
external audit (Hilhorst, 2002).  
 
The project could be regarded as a methodology for the management and support of aid 
personnel, not so much as a way of assessing humanitarian relief (Oliver, 2008), and the 
social audit approach has also the constraints of how to set general criteria for analysing the 
accomplishment of humanitarian work as well as having a high cost of implementation 
(Hilhorst, 2002). 
 
2.3.5 Certification 
 
Certification engages a third party in assessing performance in accordance with a group of 
standards or codes, and then entails certification or accreditation which is value-oriented and 
seeks quality management by guaranteeing compliance to standards (Hilhorst, 2002). In the 
humanitarian field, Humanitarian Accountability Partnership International (HAP 
International), started in 2003, is a self-regulatory initiative with a certification system. HAP 
International aims to foster the quality and accountability of humanitarian relief for crisis-
affected communities. After establishing a set of principles for accountability, HAP 
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International introduced the Standard in Accountability and Quality Management (2010) for 
providing standards covering areas such as humanity, impartiality, neutrality and 
independence. The Standard seeks to  foster the quality of humanitarian programs and calls 
for indicators: “Commitment to humanitarian standards and rights” and “Setting standards 
and building capacity” (HAP International, 2010, p. 25).  
 
Its scheme seeks to give a symbol of accreditation to humanitarian organizations which bring 
their operations into accordance with the HAP Standard (Oliver, 2008) but there is a question 
over the suitability of certification as a set of essential criteria because certification may not 
be easily used as a quality assurance system (Hilhorst, 2002). The Standard may also have 
some limitations as a tool for measuring humanitarian assistance because it is not well suited 
in the specific situations of humanitarian field.  
 
The evaluation of humanitarian aid is an important matter for its stakeholders, such as donors, 
recipients and other actors. However, considering the existing context of humanitarian aid 
debate, it is questionable that humanitarian evaluation may build an umbrella agreement on 
evaluation initiatives to be applied or create a unique organization that will regulate 
conformity in this field. In relation to this, Hilhost (2002) offers a considered perspective that 
the humanitarian field seems not to build a unique initiative for evaluation but continues to 
use various initiatives in many ways. It may thus be concluded that the nature and 
characteristics of humanitarian evaluation is very wide, and there is no single set of standards 
to assess all the domains of this broad sector. As reviewed above, the various initiatives for 
humanitarian evaluation have some value but they are also deficient in some respects. This is 
much similar to discussion on evaluation approaches to policy analysis explored in the prior 
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section, as well as the experience described in the previous chapter, which was experienced 
by the researcher during the evaluation of Korea’s response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake. 
Therefore, it is valuable for us to explore a new framework for humanitarian evaluation in the 
next section so as to make the gap of current initiatives smaller. 
2.4 McConnell’s approach 
 
The prior section has shown the significance and problems of humanitarian evaluation and 
the characteristics and shortfalls of current initiatives as tools for evaluating humanitarian aid. 
This section, in turn, leads to the analysis of the features and benefits of McConnell’s 
approach, regarding the general problems of policy analysis: how to involve political aspects 
of policy and how to determine the degree of success or failure, and also the specific 
difficulties of humanitarian evaluation: how to deal with the context of humanitarian crises 
and how to assess the operational as well as strategic levels of project or programme. As a 
new approach for evaluating policy and crisis management, McConnell’s theory is closely 
linked to the arguments of the revisionist approach. McConnell’s framework clarifies the 
definitions of policy success and failure by combining the facts of the rational approach and 
the perceptions of the argumentative approach. His theory also separates a policy into three 
different aspects: process, program and politics, does this for evaluative purposes, which may 
involve political characteristics of policy so as to explain the nature of political success. 
Moreover, the theory clearly illustrates detailed assessment criteria for each aspect, which 
evaluators can use to help in evaluation. To distinguish intermediate levels between success 
and failure, the framework further displays five-levels of classification: success, durable 
success, conflicted success, precarious success and failure. The identification of the grade of 
success/failure is essential to expose shortcomings and conflicts of public value, and though 
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there are vast number of papers on policy failure, the notion and levels of failure have not 
been well identified by prior literature and the perceptions of levels of failure are also lacking 
(McConnell, 2010a, 2010b; McConnnell, 2011). Therefore, McConnell’s approach helps 
make the gap of policy analyses smaller by involving the political aspects of policy 
implementation and determining the degree of success and/or failure of policy. 
 
In view of policy evaluation, McConnell (2010b) argues that politics and failure of policy are 
out of the range of traditional perspectives of policy sciences, and the political nature of 
policy may account for much political success, and this viewpoint is intimately connected 
with the arguments of the revisionist approach to evaluation. The reality of what constitutes 
process success is as difficult to verify as policy improvement or public value, though process 
success, such as involving stakeholders in decision making so as to alleviate implementation 
problems as well as to legitimize policy, may bring program success. The political 
dimensions of policy are also closely related to the nature of political success, and thus policy 
evaluation is needed to consider specific political actors who profit from such policies. In 
addition, McConnell (2010b) argues that process success may bring program success and the 
combination of evaluating programmatic and political aspects of a policy are needed to 
illuminate success or failure of the policy. Policy success has two aspects; the first is in 
programmatic terms, and is focused on “the effectiveness, efficiency and resilience of the 
specific policies being evaluated” (Bovens & Peters, 2001, p. 20) and the second is in 
political terms which refers to “the way policies and policy makers become evaluated in the 
political arena” (Bovens & Peters, 2001, p. 20). In relation to this, Bovens (2010, p. 584) 
argues that “the process that led to the adoption of a policy can also be analysed both from a 
programmatic and from a political perspective”. The issue of the programme aspect of policy 
closely relates to “the Lasswellian-Lindblomian view of policy making as social problem 
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solving” (Bovens & Peters, 2001, p. 20), which emphasises instrumentalism and determined 
interference in social problems, whereas the political aspect of policy refers to “the discourse 
world of systems, emotions, political ideology and power relations” (Bovens & Peters, 2001, 
p. 20). McConnell (2010b) notes that the Lasswellian-Lindblomian perspective fails to assess 
the political aspects of policy, which is outside this perspective’s scope.  
 
With regard to evaluating crisis management, McConnell (2011) details methodological 
issues, including standards, interests, scope and outcomes, which are the same context of the 
contextual and substantive issues of humanitarian evaluation (Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002). He 
argues that the issue between fact and value in crisis management success is the same as in 
policy analysis, and the question about who profits may also be problematic for evaluators 
because it involves assessing both the benefits of winners and the losses of losers in crisis 
initiatives. In addition, evaluation may be needed to weigh up the priorities for determining 
the scope of multiple contexts from the strategic level or political systems to the operational 
level or practices of crises responses as well as considering if the time periods involved are 
short, medium and long-terms outcomes. Furthermore, goals can’t be easily identified in the 
middle of the execution of crisis management, and assessing outcomes may also be 
problematic due to poor information, the complexity of outcomes and unexpected impacts of 
crisis management. Therefore, McConnell’s framework also helps make the gap of current 
humanitarian evaluation framework smaller, by combining both fact and perception in the 
notion of success and failure and by incorporating legitimacy, objectives and outcomes, 
policy goals and instruments, and policy domain criteria into his evaluation standards 
(McConnell, 2010a, 2010b; McConnnell, 2011). 
 
39 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has reviewed what public studies tell us about evaluation and the specific 
problems of the current frameworks for the evaluation of humanitarian assistance and also 
how to evaluate humanitarian aid policy so as to deal systematically with different aspects of 
humanitarian response. In order to mitigate these problems of evaluation, this thesis applies 
McConnell’s theory as the framework for the assessment of Korea’s response to the 2010 
Haiti earthquake, which has already been measured by the DAC-OECD criteria, an orthodoxy 
of humanitarian evaluation. McConnell’s approach will alleviate the general issues of policy 
analysis and the specific difficulties of humanitarian evaluation because it combines the 
quantitative method of the rational approach and the qualitative method of the argumentative 
approach. McConnell’s approach may thus be a good alternative to the DAC-OECD criteria 
and the International Red Cross Code of Conduct for conducting humanitarian evaluation. In 
addition, his theory includes the revisionist approach by identifying political aspects of policy 
as well as by employing three different dimensions of policy, which is the main failing of the 
DAC-OECD standards and the rights approach. Furthermore, his approach provides a 
continuum from success to failure and detailed evaluation criteria so that evaluators can 
easily clarify the levels of success and/or failure of policy or programme, which makes up for 
the flaws of the peer review and the social audit of humanitarian evaluation initiatives. 
Therefore, McConnell’s approach will fill the gap left by current approaches to the evaluation 
of humanitarian aid, especially the DAC-OECD criteria.  
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Chapter 3 – Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
The prior chapter reviewed the literature on policy analysis, humanitarian evaluation and 
McConnell’s theory, by focusing on the analysis of the arguments of evaluation approaches, 
the strengths and weaknesses of various initiatives for humanitarian evaluation and a new 
theory for evaluation. This chapter now presents a more detailed explanation of the 
methodology used in this study. Through the methodology presented here, this thesis 
examines a new framework for the evaluation of humanitarian aid by broadening the scope of 
evaluation, and determining the degrees of success and/or failure in different dimensions of 
policy or project. This thesis intends to elaborate an alternative approach for humanitarian 
evaluation by applying McConnell’s approach to the case of Korea’s response to the 2010 
Haiti earthquake, which has already been measured with the widely used framework of the 
DAC-OECD criteria, a current orthodoxy of the humanitarian sector.  
 
This chapter firstly explains McConnell’s framework as a useful theory for humanitarian 
evaluation and then talks about the three different realms of policy, the identification of 
success, failure and its criteria and five degrees of success or failure. Secondly, it explores the 
meaning and types of mixed methods employed in this study and states a brief overview of 
each methodology used here. Finally, it shows the justification of these research 
methodologies. 
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3.2 Evaluation framework  
 
Applying McConnell’s theory as a lens for evaluating humanitarian aid may afford an 
explanation for success and failure among three different domains of policy, by combining 
fact and interpretation in the definition of success and failure and by providing assessment 
criteria for each domain. Also, a continuum of the five-levels of classification allows us to 
distinguish success, failure and in-between. The extent to which his theory accounts for what 
happens in an emergency response can foster elucidation of what are the causes of success or 
failure of the policy. In relation to this case study, McConnell’s theory (2010b) for general 
policy evaluation is mainly applied because Korea’s response was more one of foreign policy, 
even though it was closely related to humanitarian aid, and a general policy success 
framework may thus be more suitable to this case than a framework for crisis management 
evaluation. 
 
To reveal the success and/or failure of different realms of policy as well as to account for 
some conspicuous characteristics and dynamics of policy through the relationship between 
these realms, McConnell (2010a, 2010b; McConnnell, 2011) suggests three different realms 
of policy: process, program and politics. Process attracts the most interest within different 
aspects of policy analysis, crisis management and humanitarian aid, and involves agenda 
setting, weighing of alternatives and decision-making considering the advantages and 
disadvantages of different solutions based on their principles, systems, legal frameworks and 
procedures. Program is related to process but analytically distinguished because process is 
principally policy-making but decision is chiefly implementation. Program incorporates both 
the operational level, determining initial assessment, selection of operation sites and relief 
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activities by public officials, managers and team leaders; and the strategic level, determining 
whether to assist other countries affected by disasters or crises as well as what will be the 
amount of humanitarian relief as decided by political elites and senior officials. The sphere of 
politics is gaining increasing attention in the field of crisis management (McConnnell, 2011), 
and the argumentative approach criticises the poor recognition of the political aspects by 
traditional evaluation approaches (Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002). In this study, politics is noted as 
being very relevant to humanitarian aid policy, due to its capacity to respond to overseas 
emergencies, the values it attempts to foster, and the direction of government it seeks to 
sustain. 
 
A pragmatic combination of facts relating to achievement of objects and outcomes, and 
interpretation relating to the issue of success for whom, regarding the notion of policy 
success is proposed by McConnell (2010b, p. 351); “A policy is successful if it achieves the 
goals that proponents set out to achieve and attracts no criticism of any significance and/or 
support is virtually universal”. This definition provides several useful benefits in evaluating 
humanitarian aid policy, ranging from the identification of goal achievement in each of its 
three dimensions of policy to the accommodation of the issue of success for whom by using a 
constitutional and practical recognition and by combining both the objective aspects of goal 
achievement and subjective aspects of success. Failure is the exact opposite of success and 
McConnell (2010b, p. 356) thus notes that “A policy fails if it does not achieve the goals that 
proponents set out to achieve and opposition is great and/or support is virtually non-existent”.  
 
McConnell (2010a, 2010b; McConnnell, 2011) clarifies a set of standards for evaluating 
success and failure within the process, program and political realms of project as well as 
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providing a useful measure of an assessment. With regard to process success, the first 
standard is preserving policy goals and instruments, for example, a successful process of 
policy which can easily reach its goal. Process success also needs to ensure policy legitimacy 
by following constitutional or quasi-constitutional procedures. Furthermore, process success 
also calls for building a sustainable coalition that is apt to cause a programme’s success. 
Considering the criteria for program success, the first criterion is meeting objectives, such as 
life-saving, disaster response and humanitarian relief for the population affected by disasters 
or emergencies. A related but additional measure is producing desired outcomes, which are 
mainly applied to a target group, such as the number of people rescued and the number of 
patients treated in disaster operations, and thus can be recognised as different from policy 
objectives. Furthermore, successful programs call for meeting policy domain criteria which 
are widely accepted by its community of actors in each policy sector, for instance, INSARAG 
Guidelines (UN OCHA, 2012b)  and WHO-PAHO Guidelines (WHO & PAHO, 2003)  in 
emergency responses. In view of the political criteria of success, one criterion is controlling 
the policy agenda and easing the business of governing. Another measure is sustaining the 
broad values and direction of government. Finally, political success means that opposition to 
political benefits for government is virtually non-existent. 
 
In relation to this, McConnell argues that a systematic classification can afford the 
categorisation of “different types of outcomes with broadly shared characteristics” 
(McConnnell, 2011, p. 71) and thus proposes a spectrum of five levels: success, durable 
success, conflicted success, precarious success and failure, to discriminate success, failure 
and stages in-between. Figure 3.1 shows the continuum of five degrees of success or failure. 
Placing a crisis response in any of these categories requires judgement in weighing up 
multiple outcomes and interpretation because policy analysis is not an exact science (Fischer, 
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1998; Landsbergen & Bozeman, 1987; Majone, 1989; McConnnell, 2011). This is well 
presented in the argument of Wildavsky (1979, p. 3), “policy analysis presumes creativity, a 
subject on which much is written but little is known”.  
 
Figure 3.1 The crisis management success/failure spectrum (McConnnell, 2011, p. 71). 
In the continuum, outright success assumes the full achievement of policy goals but may also 
involve cases which have very minor failures in preserving goals. Durable success is the 
second best result but is one stage closer to failure in the continuum. Though it has some 
failings, flaws and opposition, a project is successful enough to be durable because it can deal 
with criticism and can maintain the achievement of what was expected. Conflicted success 
further moves in the direction of the failure end of the continuum because it falls short of 
what was to be accomplished and thus accomplishment and failure are on an equal footing 
because there are considerable time delays, great target shortfalls and communication failure 
(McConnell, 2010b). Precarious success moves towards the edge of failure. Even though 
policies or crisis initiatives achieve a minor good result, defects and criticism overwhelm a 
small amount of support. Outright failure involves the cases of very minor successes “in 
terms of meeting goals and benefiting target groups that are, nevertheless, overwhelmed by 
pathologies (McConnell, 2010a, p. 62).   
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3.3 Research design 
 
The prior section looked at McConnell’s theory as the framework for the case of Korea’s 
response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake and this has in turn led to the exploration of the method 
because it is used in this study. For exploring a new theory for humanitarian evaluation, this 
study proposed the following research question:  
To what extent can Korea’s response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake be described as successful? 
In order to answer this question, this study adopted a mixed methods design to foster the 
accuracy of data, to further investigate the degree of success or failure of policy by 
incorporating information from quantitative and qualitative sources, to avoid biases intrinsic 
to single-method research by compensating with other methods and to evolve the analyses, 
and findings by using different sets of sources or methods (Denscombe, 2008). A mixed 
methods research design such as the combination of quantitative methods and qualitative 
methods, can bring the best results (Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002). In view of this perspective, the 
study employed quantitative and qualitative data drawn from a carefully selected range of 
sources as follows: a comprehensive document review relevant to humanitarian aid and the 
Haitian response; focus group interviews of experts in rescue team and medical team; key 
informant interviews with the staff of Korean, Haitian and other countries’ governments and 
international organizations; and an online survey.  
 
In the social sciences, quantitative research relates to empirical methods, such as the 
collection of empirical data including online questionnaires and is initiated by philosophical 
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positivism. Koido et al. (2000), for example, employed quantitative methods such as the total 
treatment of patients, in order to assess the response of the Japan Disaster Relief Team (JDR) 
to the 1999 Taiwan earthquake. Qualitative research, on the other hand, seeks an in-depth 
interpretation of human behaviour and the perceptions of individual interests, and Oliver 
(2008) applied a qualitative research design  in her thesis on the influence of evaluation in an 
international NGO of the humanitarian aid field. The most general method used in the 
qualitative approach is to interview people especially focus groups and key informants. The 
focus group interview entails a moderator assisting a small group discussion among selected 
individuals on a specific theme and this method was applied in this study to get a clear insight 
into the rescue and medical teams’ motivations and practices in the Haiti response. A mixed 
methods approach may be useful to evaluate humanitarian aid because it may help obtain a 
comprehensive understanding of hidden motivations, to provide a more diverse perspective 
and to collect more specific information and many researches have thus used this method. 
Tremblay (2010), for example, used a mixed methods approach and involved aid community 
efforts so as to foster quality management and coordination practices for future humanitarian 
responses to disasters or crises, and Bhattacharjee and Lossio (2011) also employed both 
quantitative and qualitative data collection from a selected range of document reviews, 
surveys and interviews. 
 
The first data source used in this thesis is a comprehensive document review using both 
internal and external documents, reports and data on the Haiti response, as well as Korea’s 
policies and legal framework related to humanitarian action, in order to comprehend the 
architecture of the overall response system of Korea and to explore operations and activities 
of the Korea Disaster Relief (KDR) teams. Also, to measure the achievements of the KDR 
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teams, the study identified various quantitative sources, such as the number of patients treated 
and the number of people rescued from the disaster area. 
 
Keeping in consideration that qualitative methods can involve project participant perceptions 
of outcome, including the perspectives of local, field staff and organization or government 
workers (Bolton et al., 2007), the second source of data is focus group interviews and key 
informant interviews with those who were involved in the humanitarian operation, namely 
domestic personnel and international personnel, which were conducted between 23 July and 
15 September, 2011. The interviewees offered insight into their own perceptions and 
experience of how successful the entire response to the Haiti earthquake was and also how 
successful their own involvement was, and the interviews examined both the perspectives of 
those who conducted the response activities and the perceptions of those who were in charge 
of the missions of each agency. The informants were selected on the basis of discussions with 
the two coordinators of the National 119 Rescue Services (NRS) and the National Medical 
Center (NMC). There is the possibility that a number of people have been excluded, but the 
design, to prevent this restraint, has used a method where the two coordinators, one from the 
NRS, and one from the NMC, reviewed the sets of respondents with consideration to their 
professional standing as well as years of experience. The interviewees were asked to talk 
freely of their opinions and experiences, even related to other disaster relief activities for a 
comprehensive consideration of overseas emergency responses. In addition, there were key 
informant interviews with a range of stakeholders including relevant Korean agencies, the 
Haitian government and other governments, UN agencies, NGOs and international 
organisations. Interviewees included managers and/or staff of the Korean Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade (MOFAT), KOICA, National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) 
of Korea, NRS, Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW), Korea Foundation for 
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International Healthcare (KOFIH), NMC; the Haitian government and the Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JAICA) in Haiti; UN agencies, the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, 
World Vision, and Good Neighbors in Haiti. Interview times ranged from 30 minutes to 60 
minutes, and most were conducted in Korean and English which did not present any problem 
because the researcher’s maternal language is Korean and he can also use English fluently. 
All of the interviews were conducted in compliance with an ethical review developed for this 
project and approved by the Seoul National University in 2011.  All data and materials used 
in this thesis were again approved by Humanities Low Risk Subcommittee, The University of 
Sydney in July, 2013. A protocol for two focus group interviews, namely search and rescue 
staff and medical staff, and two sets of questionnaires, one for the investigation of the 
strategic aspects of Korea’s overseas emergency response and the other for the analysis of the 
perspective of the officials of the Haitian government, the staff of international organizations 
and NGOs in Haiti. 
 
The third method used in this research was an internet survey to examine the requirements of 
fostering a medical workforce for emergency relief, and its questionnaire is attached as 
Appendix Ⅱ. The survey was conducted by the evaluation team in 2011 for investigating the 
perceptions and motivations of overseas emergency relief activities. The research which 
consisted of a total number of 180 online surveys was responded by the members of the 
Korea Academy of Disaster Medicine, which was mainly composed of emergency medicine 
physician, and the National Disaster Life Support. The research permitted anonymity which 
supported the answering of questions with complete honesty. Privacy was not a significant 
issue in this survey as the analysis on how to foster the workforce of medical staff in 
humanitarian relief did not ask the responders to give individual or distinguishing information. 
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A total number of 70 people (38.9%) completed the survey in which 55 were male (78.6%) 
and 15 were female (21.4%). This group was composed of 41 doctors of emergency medicine 
(58.6%), 1 doctor of non-emergency medicine (1.4%), 10 nurses (14.24%), 16 emergency 
medicine technicians (22.8%)  and 2 others (2.8%) (KOICA, 2011a). 
 
This research tried to complement a process approach so as to explore the complexity and the 
unexpected results of humanitarian aid and to foster policy improvement, institutional change 
and inter-agency partnership. A process approach mainly focuses on the relations in, the 
context of, and the changes in projects and identifies dynamic, unanticipated and diverse 
components of humanitarian relief with the help of the different methodologies used (David 
Mosse, John Farrington, & Rew, 1998). A process approach is actor-oriented and regards 
evaluation as a learning process and this approach is closely related to ALNAP’s efforts in 
the humanitarian sector (Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002). ALNAP (Bhattacharjee & Lossio, 2011; 
Haver, 2011; Patrick, 2011; Rencort et al., 2010) has conducted and issued various evaluation 
reports about humanitarian relief for the 2010 Haiti earthquake as part of a learning process 
in the hope of changing the current reality. In consideration of the argument that a 
combination of approaches is also required to comprehend the overall context and the policy 
and  institutional circumstances (Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002; Suhrke, 1999),  a participatory 
approach was also tried to identify the objectives, practices and results of policies involving 
all the relevant perspectives of stakeholders, for example, organisations, actors and groups 
which affect or are affected by the policy. The approach usually involves local interests, 
perceptions and interpretations and avoids donor-oriented and one-sided evaluation by 
bringing in these local perspectives.  A participatory approach often identifies the goals, 
processes, outcomes and results in  all stakeholder participation, including donors, recipients 
and other actors involved in the humanitarian project (Desai & Potter, 2006; Frerks & 
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Hilhorst, 2002). In consideration of this argument, this research employed a participatory 
approach to incorporate the beneficiaries’ opinions and interests and to further investigate any 
negative or unexpected impacts of Korea’s response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake. 
 
In keeping with this, the study interviewed Haitians who lived in the emergency 
accommodation camps in order to understand, in their own words, the greatest needs of 
Haitians affected by the earthquake during the acute phase, particularly in the area of search 
and rescue and emergency medical services. Given the difficulty of tracking and evaluating 
the direct beneficiaries of the services provided by the KDR teams, informants were 
expanded to include those who were not direct beneficiaries. Haitians who were affected 
either directly or indirectly by the earthquake and who resided in the camps for internally 
displaced persons in Port-au-Prince were included in the study. This was a qualitative study 
based on open-ended semi-structured interviews that lasted 30 minutes to one hour. 
Informants were identified using the snowball method and through partner organizations. 
Informed consent forms were collected before each voluntary interview. No financial 
compensation was given to informants. A total number of 20 interviews were conducted in 
the period between August 15-19, 2011, involving 11 women and 9 men. Interviews were 
conducted in English and Haitian Kreyol with a Haitian interpreter translating in real-time for 
the interviewer and interviewee. The interviews were simultaneously recorded, transcribed, 
translated and analysed. Six different camps in Port-au-Prince were visited in the study: Place 
P’tion, Place Dessalines, Ravine Pintade, ACRA 2 in Juvenat P’tion-ville, PARC ACRA, and 
ENAF 2. 
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The theme included in the study regards: the acute phase assistance in the immediate 
aftermath of the earthquake, focusing on the search and rescue and emergency medical 
services. Most of the informants interviewed in this study expressed deep gratitude to the 
international community, including the Korean response, for providing search and rescue 
teams as well as emergency medical services even if they were not direct beneficiaries of 
such services. It could be inferred from the interview data that Korea needed a more robust 
delivery system that was able to systematically track the location of the afflicted in a timely 
manner, and real-time tracking of the delivery and receipt of aid, and that it is important to 
link up the emergency medical services to the existing medical networks to foster increased 
collaboration and coordination of care among international responders. Based on the 
interviews conducted in this study, in terms of the midterm recovery efforts, Haitians were 
asking for job creation in order to improve their own agency to provide food, water, shelter, 
housing and education for their households. It was made clear that in both the acute phase 
assistance and in the recovery and relief efforts, it is imperative that aid organizations deliver 
sufficient goods and services in an equitable and timely manner. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
This study applies McConnell’s theory as an evaluation framework together with a mixed 
methods research design for the case study of Korea’s response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake. 
McConnell’s framework divides policy into three dimensions: process, programme and 
politics, so as to explain some characteristics and dynamics of policy through the 
relationships between these dimensions. His framework also provides a set of standards for 
the evaluation of policy in order to elucidate success and failure, as well as a continuum of 
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five levels of classification: success, durable success, conflicted success, precarious success 
and failure, for distinguishing intermediate levels between success and failure. A mixed 
methods research design was used in this research because, as Bolton et al. (2007) have 
explained, a mixed methods design, being the combination of quantitative and qualitative 
methodology, is necessary for humanitarian evaluation so as to illuminate the complexity of 
humanitarian action and its context. In addition, this thesis tried to supplement a process 
approach which regards evaluation as a learning process, and a participatory approach which 
involves beneficiaries’ perceptions and interests for more complete humanitarian evaluation, 
because it is essential for evaluators to approach in a broad-based way consideration of  the 
overall context of humanitarian crises (Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 
2004).  
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Chapter 4 – Evaluation of the Process Dimension 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter Three identified the methodologies that were used to investigate the research 
propositions. This and the following two chapters, in turn, report on the outcomes of the data-
gathering phase. The data and information are analysed in relation to the overarching research 
question posed in this thesis:  
To what extent can Korea’s response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake be described as successful?  
In order to answer this research question, this thesis analyses the data through the lens of 
McConnell’s (2010b) framework for a general policy evaluation including policy making, 
practice and politics. The results of this study are presented in three parts: evaluation of the 
process, programme and political dimensions. Also, the research assesses each of these parts 
via McConnell’s five-fold categorization, namely: success, durable success, conflicted 
success, precarious success and failure by employing relevant criteria for each dimension.  
 
This chapter on the process aspect, “the way in which problems are defined, options 
examined, stakeholders consulted and decisions made” (McConnell, 2010a, p. 40), includes 
institutional structures, rules and procedures, as well as the cognitive processes of actors. 
With regard to process success, the first criterion is preserving policy goals and instruments. 
Process success also requires conferring legitimacy, “through the following of 
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constitutionally and quasi-constitutionally recognized procedures” (McConnnell, 2011, p. 68). 
Moreover, process success also needs building a sustainable coalition. 
 
4.2 Preserving policy goals and instruments 
 
It seems reasonable to suggest that if an outcome of a policy is “the preservation of the broad 
values and detailed policy instruments” (McConnell, 2010a, p. 41), this may be regarded as a 
process success. In view of this, Korea’s response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake was nearly 
successful because it preserved the goals and instruments of the relevant policies. Taking into 
account the policy goals and instruments of overseas emergency response, the Korean 
government provided a total of US$10 million for the Haiti response. The first US$1 million 
of aid forms the primary focus of this research and was clearly allocated for emergency 
humanitarian response, including US$800,000 in dispatching relief teams and US$200,000 in 
delivering relief goods (Jeong & Park, 2010a). Having no consultative capability actively 
engaged in Haiti, Korea’s response was executed to some extent directly in keeping with its 
existent humanitarian policy structures. The policy represents three methods of assistance: 
delivery of rapid and effective Korean humanitarian aid, enhancement of the capacity of 
affected countries to prepare for and respond to disasters or emergencies, and assistance to 
major agents of international humanitarian assistance. The purposes, principles and types of 
overseas emergency response of the Korean government are plainly stated in the Overseas 
Emergency Relief Act and its Presidential Decree (Government of the Republic of Korea, 
2007) (hereafter, the Act). Article 1 and 4 of the Act states that it seeks “to contribute to 
providing rapid rescue and relief to disaster-affected countries when overseas disasters occur”, 
for example, dispatching relief teams, providing relief supplies and supporting interim 
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recovery from disasters, based on humanitarianism (Government of the Republic of Korea, 
2007). Considering the international and economic status of Korea, its aid should be carried 
out “in close cooperation with affected countries or international organizations, upon request 
from the affected countries”, including search and rescue and health care activities, support 
for transportation and other matters prescribed by Article 4 and 5 of the Act’s Presidential 
Decree (Government of the Republic of Korea, 2007). In addition, the scale and manner of 
aid are considered by the damage scale and internal response capacity of the countries 
affected by disasters or crises and Korean government’s capable fund and accessibility. 
Following the architecture of Korea’s overseas emergency response, the KDR teams have 
been dispatched many times, for example, to Myanmar after the cyclone and to China after 
the earthquake in 2008, to Indonesia after the 2009 earthquake, to Haiti after the 2010 
earthquake and to Japan after the 2011 earthquake and tsunami, by the cooperation of 
relevant ministries and agencies: the MOFAT controls the overall relief effort; the Ministry 
of Defence (MOD) supports rapid transport of personnel or supplies by military aircrafts on 
request; the MOHW selects and trains medical teams and provides medical supplies; the 
NEMA and the NRS maintain and train a deployment-ready rescue team and related 
equipment; and the KOICA prepares and manages supplies and provides support through its 
offices in the affected country (Government of the Republic of Korea, 2012). Therefore, 
Korea’s response to the Haiti earthquake preserved the policy aims and measures through the 
dispatch of the KDR teams and the supply of relief goods to the Haiti, but it was not perfect 
response when giving consideration to Haiti’s scale of loss in all areas affected by the disaster 
in its entity. 
 
Korea’s response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake could not have avoided the problem of 
information constraint, and its response was thus not completely relevant to the situation in 
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Haiti, even though the response attributed to some extent to Haiti’s recovery, which was 
attested to Juan Alonso, an advisor of the WHO/PAHO, when interviewed: “I well know the 
dispatch of the KDR team in Haiti and highly praise its activities”. Louis Lery, like many 
other informants interviewed, credited the international community in general for providing 
assistance: 
        Right after the earthquake, when we had all kinds of problems in Haiti, the international  
community came to help us in what we couldn’t provide ourselves and that met many of  
our needs…it was more than success for me. Even if, myself, didn’t receive many things,  
others who were in the same situation received great relief. (Louis Lery) 
Though information management and needs assessment are important to emergency response 
(Bhattacharjee & Lossio, 2011), the Korean government did not only spread out a suitable information 
management team but also was effective in a rapid assessment of the initial damage and impact in the 
earthquake-affected area. As an entirely supply-oriented approach, in lieu of a needs-based approach to 
humanitarian aid, was used in the response, Korea’s response did not much satisfy the demands of the 
field. The KDR did not appropriately collect information relating to casualties and physical damage at 
the acute phase of the Haiti earthquake and actual local needs were also not reflected due to the practical 
problems such as “the available budget, the accessibility to the affected areas and the local situation” 
(KOICA, 2011a, p. 351). Moreover, the implementation of prioritizing the demands from the field was 
lacking when considering the vulnerabilities and gaps in relief in the country or area affected by the 
disaster. These deficiencies caused many problems at various levels, such as the delay of departure and 
arrival of the KDR teams and the issues of transit of goods and support for the staff deployed. According 
to the report of the KOFIH (2010), there was general dissatisfaction among medical personnel who 
participated in the operation of the Haiti response, especially in the items such as: size and constitution 
57 
 
of medical team; preparedness of medicine and medical supplies; and preparedness of medical 
equipments. Information-gathering was also not sufficient and failed to fully reflect on-site conditions 
because it depended on formal diplomatic lines of information, information from international 
organizations and the mass media. Thus, the Korean government had difficulty in determining 
measures to support the humanitarian needs of the Haitians affected by the disaster with regard to the 
on-site circumstances. As a result, the Korean government nearly failed to collect essential information, 
such as the death and injury toll and the number of displaced people, in the early stage of the earthquake. 
This kind of information should have been rapidly and adequately provided for decision-making 
and action preparedness, but the information that was gathered was not well organized and 
did not truly reflect the context of the Haiti earthquake. There were some good examples in 
reference to information management in response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake. The U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID), for example, deployed a Disaster Assistance 
Response Team (DART) as a rapid response management team made up of disaster relief specialists, 
who conduct assessments, identify and prioritize needs, manage on-site relief activities, report on the 
situation, recommend response actions, and coordinate with affected countries and other response 
organizations in disaster fields (USAID, 2011). 
 
Needs assessment in Korea’s response was the prioritization in the context of the Haiti 
earthquake and a better needs assessment would thus have allowed a more suitable response 
to the disaster in the country affected by the earthquake (KOICA, 2011a). However, Korea’s 
needs assessment was poor in the Haiti earthquake due to the lack of data collection and 
information management. Having almost no substantial data about Haiti’s condition misled 
the demand analysis for the Haiti field and this caused issues with the structure of medical 
staff, the packing of medical equipment and the location of the medical office, all of which 
was pointed out by the focus group interview with the medical staff involved in the Haiti 
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operations. A weak assessment of the situation of Haiti’s crisis brought a delay in the proper 
response and thus led to the hindrance of the accomplishment of policy goals, for example, 
resolving the humanitarian crisis of Haiti (KOICA, 2011a). Therefore, the experience of Haiti 
was pivotal in the development of the Korea’s system of overseas emergency relief (OECD, 
2012). The Korean government, for example, set up the Plan for the Advancement of 
Overseas Emergency Relief (MOFAT, 2010) (hereafter, the Plan), in May 2010, which seeks 
more rapid decision-making and established the target of dispatching a KDR team within 72 
hours to a humanitarian crisis. These efforts resulted in Korea achieving a significant 
response to the Japan earthquake, in March 2011, by deploying an advance team for 
information collection and needs assessment in the disaster field (Government of the 
Republic of Korea, 2012). 
 
In light of the criterion of preserving policy goals and instruments, the process domain of 
Korea’s response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake might be described as a durable process 
success because the Korean government contributed help to a certain extent to Haiti through 
the dispatch of the KDR teams and the supply of relief goods, though the scale of the relief 
was not quite relevant in view of the economic status of Korea and the total loss suffered by 
Haiti in the disaster. In this dimension of Korea’s response, the lack of information 
management as well as the lack of needs assessment caused certain problems, such as the 
delay of the KDR teams’ response and the assistance of the supply-oriented approach, and 
these problems hindered the contribution of Korea’s response to the population affected by 
the earthquake.  
 
4.3 Conferring Legitimacy 
59 
 
 
It tends to be a success for government if a policy is formulated by constitutional or quasi-
constitutional procedures because the policy can do “what it set out to do, without any 
significant questions over its right to do so” (McConnell, 2010a, p. 44). In view of legitimacy, 
including the legal framework, policy papers and various kinds of guidelines, Korea’s 
response to the Haiti disaster is considered in this section. In general the response followed 
the relevant rules, though the response met many challenges mainly due to the late arrival of 
the KDR teams in the earthquake struck area of Haiti.  
 
Referring to the large-scale loss of life and property in Haiti caused by an earthquake on 
January 13, 2010 at 06:53 (January 12, 2010 at 16:53 local time), the Korean government 
opened the inter-governmental committee on January 14 at 08:50 for determining how to 
respond the event and decided to provide humanitarian relief worth US$ 1 million, including 
the dispatch of an emergency rescue team and the assistance of emergency relief goods 
(MOFAT, 2010). Although the decision was made over 24 hours after the earthquake’s 
occurrence, the effect of the response was hindered by some other problems, such as resource 
mobilization and transportation issues. It took about 2 days from the occurrence of the 
disaster for the 1
st
 KDR team led by search and rescue staff to depart, and about 3 more days 
to arrive in the field after its departure. The 2
nd
 KDR team led by medical staff departed on 
January 20 and started its activities on January 22, 10 days after the earthquake struck 
(KOICA, 2011a). The arrival time did not adhere to general principles of humanitarian aid, 
for example, the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group Guidelines and 
Methodology (hereafter, INSARAG Guidelines) recommends that search and rescue 
operations should commence “in the affected country within 48 hours of the posting of the 
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disaster” on the Virtual On-Site Operational Coordination Centre (OSOCC) (UN OCHA, 
2012a, p. 34). UN OCHA has fostered the development of the INSARAG Guidelines so as to 
result in a coordinated and efficient rescue effort by integrating effectively the operations of 
international urban search and rescue (hereafter, USAR) (UN OCHA, 2012a). Considering 
this experience of the late arrival of the KDR teams, the Korean government has developed a 
new strategy for facilitating the delivery of emergency response to humanitarian crises, in 
May 2010, for example, the use of military aircraft following the self-reflection on the 
response to the Haiti earthquake (Government of the Republic of Korea, 2012). 
 
The Korean government’s humanitarian assistance is grounded in its legislation and policy papers, 
including a legal framework and major policy decisions. The Framework Act on International 
Development Cooperation (National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, 2007) manifests humanitarian 
aid as an essential component of Korea’s development cooperation, and the Strategic Plan for 
International Development Cooperation (Government of the Republic of Korea, 2010), which is a 
strategic blueprint for the mid-term official development assistance policy, also includes humanitarian 
action in its development strategy and states that “Korea will contribute to world peace and prosperity 
by strengthening humanitarian assistance and peace-building efforts in countries affected by natural 
disasters and armed conflicts” (Government of the Republic of Korea, 2012, p. 45). The Act, enacted in 
March 2007, also gives an extensive legal framework for rapid and efficient inter-governmental and 
civil response to overseas humanitarian crises. In addition, MOFAT created a division, dedicated to 
humanitarian aid, in 2007, and established a humanitarian policy framework, Policy Paper on 
Humanitarian Assistance (MOFAT, 2008), in July 2008. Furthermore, as a United Nations Good 
Humanitarian Donorship (UN GHD) member since July 2009, Korea focuses on providing assistance to 
meet the demands of humanitarian aid based on the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and 
independence, in line with the UN GHD policy (Government of the Republic of Korea, 2012).  
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In consideration of the above, the features of Korea’s system of overseas emergency relief are its legal 
framework and structure, which relate to the process dimension of McConnell’s approach. The Act 
states the objectives and principles of overseas emergency aid and allows for various ways of relief 
activity: to spread out an emergency rescue team and a medical support team and to provide relief goods 
and other in-kind supplies, depending on the intensity of the humanitarian crisis. The Act brought into 
being an inter-governmental coordination system and the Public-Private Joint Committee on Overseas 
Emergency Relief, chaired by the Minister of MOFAT and authorized to decide whom, what, how and 
to what extent aid is provided to deal with the aftermath of large-scale humanitarian crises (MOFAT, 
2007). The structure of humanitarian aid response is now formed with MOFAT functioning as a control 
tower for policies and budget planning and allocation, with a hierarchical and vertical system 
descending to KOICA. Whereas MOFAT concentrates on policy and strategic planning as well as 
setting possible conditions in which numerous actors can play a constructive role in utilizing their 
competitive advantages, KOICA coordinates relief supplies and dispatches specialists as well as 
selecting and maintaining the necessary workforce and at all times collaborating with relevant 
agencies, such as NRS, KOFIH, NMC and Seoul National University Hospital (MOFAT, 
2013). 
 
In relation to the criterion of conferring legitimacy, the research finds that there is an outright 
process success in Korea’s response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake, because the process 
dimension of the response successfully adhered to the legal and institutional procedure. An 
inter-ministerial committee for discussing how to respond the Haiti earthquake, for example, 
was held within about 24 hours of the occurrence of the disaster and also decided to dispatch 
a KDR team led by search and rescue staff and to provide the assistance of relief goods. This 
thus met the legal procedure of the Act, even though the arrival time of the team in the 
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disaster field was not suitable to preserve the policy goal of providing rapid rescue and relief 
to disaster-affected countries, as is described in the Act (National Assembly of the Republic 
of Korea, 2007). 
 
4.4 Building a Sustainable Coalition 
 
The success of policy process in involving and considering the interests of relevant actors 
may bring programme success because a sustainable coalition of support has the tendency to 
render successful implementation (McConnell, 2010a). In view of this, the cooperation 
among relevant organizations and the partnership between the public and private sectors for 
emergency relief are examined in this section. The collaboration between relevant ministries 
and agencies was successful because of the first combined response of a search and rescue 
team and a medical team; conversely the partnership between the public and private sectors in 
the response was weak because of a lack of concrete guidance to cooperate with each other.  
 
In the case of the Haiti earthquake, the cooperation of the related organizations was 
successful because the Haiti case was the first corporate response, the combination between a 
search and rescue team and a medical team, through the maintenance of the close relationship 
among relevant agencies and organizations and lesson learning from past experiences. Based 
on the Act, MOFAT led the response as a control tower with the cooperation of relevant 
ministries, for example, NEMA, MOHW and MOD at the strategic level. KOICA also 
conducted its operations and activities with the help of different agencies, such as NRS, NMC 
and KOFIH of the operational level (KOICA, 2011a). After the occurrence of the Haiti 
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earthquake, an inter-ministry emergency meeting was held within 24 hours, including the 
Prime Minister’s Office, MOFAT, MOHW and NEMA, and it decided to dispatch a relief 
team and supply relief goods in consultation with relevant ministries (KOICA, 2011a). 
 
However, the Korean public-private sector partnership for the response was poor because the 
division of their roles and the cooperation system between them were unclear or sometimes 
competitive, which was identified by many informants interviewed from MOFAT, KOICA 
and the NGOs. There was the absence of prior tuning between governments and NGOs and 
no connection between the activities of KDR teams and the efforts of NGOs in the Haiti 
event (KOICA, 2011a). Taking this into account, it may be helpful to Korea’s capacity to 
assist to link short-term relief with long term development to make use of the know-how, 
experiences and resources of the private sector (KOICA, 2011a). It may thus be necessary to 
utilise private sector resources to link relief to rehabilitation and development because the 
issue of connecting short-term relief with long-term recovery is significant in fostering the 
living conditions and the degree of satisfaction of the population affected by disasters or 
emergencies. If not so, the overall effectiveness of emergency relief will be restricted 
(Bhattacharjee & Lossio, 2011). To do this, the Japan Platform may be a good example 
because it aims to combine the efforts of NGOs, the business community, and a government 
agency (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan) for a more rapid and effective execution of 
humanitarian relief with a tripartite cooperation system. The system of the Japan Platform is 
rooted on equal partnership and takes advantage of the individual sectors’ characteristics and 
resources. The Japan Platform further seeks to proffer financial assistance to the financially 
frail NGOs of Japan through establishing a fund utilizing the Foreign Ministry’s ODA funds 
as well as requesting donations from the private sector (Japan Platform, 2013). With the 
above experience and the example of Japan Platform, the Plan, the Korean government’s self-
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reflection on its response to the Haiti earthquake, looks at establishing a public-private 
cooperation network for overseas emergency relief and supplying financial and non-financial 
assistance to emergency relief teams of private organizations. To do this, in 2012, rooted on 
the Plan, the Korean government chose 8 private organizations based on their capacities and 
experiences in overseas humanitarian work and plans to supply them with financial assistance 
so that they can collaborate through discussion with the government in the occurrence of an 
overseas emergency (Government of the Republic of Korea, 2012). 
 
On the third criterion of building a sustainable coalition, the process realm of Korea’s 
response to the Haiti earthquake constitutes a conflicted process success because Korea did 
not have a close public-private partnership, even though the Korean government managed a 
significant inter ministry cooperation related to the response. In order to overcome this 
problem, the Korean government has sought to build a stronger partnership with NGOs in 
order to respond more rapidly and efficiently to overseas emergencies in accordance with the 
Plan. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
It seems reasonable to describe the process realm of Korea’s response to the 2010 Haiti 
earthquake as a durable process success. Korea’s response preserved the policy goals of the 
provision of rapid rescue and relief to the affected country through, for example, the dispatch 
of rescue team and medical team and the supply of relief goods. In consideration of these, the 
Korean government deployed the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 KDR teams and supplied relief goods to the 
Haitians affected by the earthquake. In addition, Korea’s response adhered to the legal and 
institutional procedures, such as the Act (Government of the Republic of Korea, 2007) and 
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the Policy Paper in Humanitarian Aid (MOFAT, 2008) when the government decided on the 
response and dispatched the KDR teams to the Haiti. However, the measures of the response 
were not sufficient in consideration of the total loss from the Haiti earthquake. 
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Chapter 5 - Evaluation of the Program Dimension 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
The program dimension of policy is about what governments do with public personnel, public 
expenditure and tools of government, in this paper, for example, the mobilization of KDR 
teams including search and rescue team and medical support team, a mechanism to manage 
and support KDR teams, and includes relationships with the Haitian government, UN OCHA, 
clusters and other humanitarian actors. The measures of program assessment are also many, 
and the same qualifications apply in terms of mutual exclusiveness and potential for conflict 
between them (McConnell, 2010a). The first measure of program assessment is meeting 
objectives, encapsulating the bureaucratic objectives of execution, as well specific program 
objectives. A related but additional criterion is producing desired outcomes. Objectives and 
outcomes might overlap, but the outcome is more focused on a target group. Furthermore, 
meeting policy domain criteria is a measurement. Even though not all policy sectors have 
values that are greatly accepted by its community of actors, such values are instruments of 
assessment in that policy realm (McConnell, 2010a). 
 
5.2 Meeting Objectives 
 
On the basis of meeting objectives, if “governments did what they set out to do” (McConnell, 
2010a, p. 47), a policy can be alleged to be successful. The implementation of the objectives , 
such as to save lives and to respond immediate needs, was limited by the lack of leadership 
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and coordination, resource mobilization and transportation. The communication and 
coordination between rescue, medical and support units were poor due to the absence of an 
accurate command and control system and organizational standards, the lack of coordination 
of operational direction between the participated agencies, and the problem of mechanism to 
manage and support the KDR teams (Hong, 2010). Especially, KOICA (2011a) critically 
pointed out that the absence of an accurate command and control system and an organization 
standard disturbed the communication between the rescue and the medical and the support 
units of the KDR team and hindered their field operations. 
 
The rapid mobilization and transportation of the KDR teams’ personnel and equipment had a 
significant setback due to the usage of a commercial airline and its regulation of baggage 
claim. Specifically, the 2
nd
 KDR team bought medical supplies and goods in Dominica for 
establishing a clinic and thus started medical treatment on January 23, one day later than 
expected (Ahn, Hong, Lee, Ahn, & Kim, 2010). Korea did not perform well in terms of the 
rapid deployment of medical team due to the recruitment of civil volunteers, which caused an 
asymmetry of the numbers of nurses and doctors in the team and there was also the problem 
of the lack of education and training which is essential for relief staff, who could meet 
various emergency relief services and deal with relief work. According to many experts 
interviewed in the medical section, it was difficult for the Korean government to mobilize 
medical staff because a staff member’s participation on a medical team for overseas 
emergency relief is not mandatory and this has often resulted in a lack of scale and structural 
flexibility in the medical teams of the KDR (KOICA, 2011a).  
 
Even though the response was the first corporate action between a rescue team and a medical 
team in overseas emergency relief operations and the overall structure thus enhanced the 
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capability of the KDR teams, the teams faced a major challenge in getting the right balance of 
numbers and quality, skills and expertise (KOICA, 2011a). The KDR teams were composed 
of several distinct entities including the search and rescue unit of the NRS, the medical 
support unit of the KOFIH and the NMC, and support unit of the KOICA. In response to the 
Haiti earthquake, the overall structure of the KDR teams was appropriate to the policy 
objectives of providing rapid life rescue and relief to Haitians directly affected by the 
earthquake. The 1st KDR team was led by the rescue unit to provide life-saving response and 
the 2nd KDR team led by the medical unit to foster medical services to the affected 
population, and this is detailed in Table 4.1 below. 
Table 5.1 Structures of the 1
st
 KDR versus 2
nd
 KDR 
KDR team 1
st
 2
nd
 
Period 2010.01.15-25 2010.01.20-30 
 
Staff 
Rescue 25 4 
Medical 7 18 
Support 2 2 
Others 7 16 
Total 41 40 
(Source: adapted from the NEMA(2010) and the KOFIH(2010)) 
However, the Korean government deployed only 25 rescue specialists in the 1
st
 KDR team 
and the team lacked sufficient personnel with regard to the INSARAG  Guidelines (UN 
OCHA, 2012b, p. 34), which recommends a rescue team “must be adequately staffed to allow 
for 24 hours operations at 2 separate sites for up to 10 days”. With regard to the medical team, 
the number of nurses and assistance staff was not sufficient to meet the required 
doctor/assistance ratio, which was confirmed in the focus group interview with medical staff, 
who served in the Haiti earthquake, as well as the report of the KOFIH (2010). Table 5.2 
compares and contrasts the structure of the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 medical teams of the KDR in the Haiti 
69 
 
response and the JDR medical team in the manual of the JAICA (Kawahara, 2011), so as to 
point out the ratio difference between doctor and nurse or support staff. 
  Table 5.2 Comparison the structures of the medical teams among the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 KDR and the JDR  
 1
st
 2
nd
 JDR 
Total 7 18 22 (21) 
Team leader  1 1 
Doctor 3 8 4 (3) 
Nurse 3 5 6 (7) 
Pharmacist  2 1 
Medical support   4 
Logistic 1 2 5 
(Source: adapted from the KOFIH(2010) and the Kawahara(2011)) 
 
The absence of a highly experienced senior manager in the Haiti operations also made the 
activities of the 1
st
 KDR team problematic. If the Korean government had made decisions 
early on regarding the management capacity needed to deploy in Haiti, it would have been 
possible for it to deploy a senior leader. Even if the government could not find someone for a 
long dispatch, there was no reason why one of its senior directors from MOFAT or KOICA 
could not have been dispatched for some weeks in the early phase. The Haiti case clearly 
demanded being dealt with by strong command and control, not by consensual decision-
making, which was evidenced by many informants interviewed in the focus group of the 
search and rescue staff who participated in the Haiti operation. A specialist of the NRS who 
was interviewed stated that “the 1st KDR team did not well cooperate the UN OCHA and its 
various cluster meetings. This has mainly caused by the absence of an experienced senior 
director who could deal with the cooperation between the KDR team and the affected country 
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or the UN”. In addition, in consideration of the corporate response, many participant agencies 
had a recognized rule that the KDR’s priorities prevail over the preferences of individual 
agencies (Hong, 2010). The failure of deploying a senior and experienced coordinator to 
Haiti rendered a leadership gap and resulted in a lack of coordination within the KDR team, 
which led to a vacuum in leadership and ultimately affected the KDR teams’ ability to 
perform their objectives effectively.  
 
With reference to the first criterion of meeting objectives, the research finds that there was 
only a precarious program success due to the problems of leadership and coordination, the 
mobilization of medical staff and the transportation of KDR teams. The KDR teams achieved 
no saving of lives, only some corpse collection from their search and rescue activities, and 
principally treated chronic diseases, not patients injured directly by the earthquake. Though it 
was the first corporate response to overseas emergencies, the response nearly did not meet the 
objectives of saving lives and responding to immediate needs because of the problems, 
mentioned above. 
 
5.3 Producing Desired Outcomes 
 
In the perspective of outcomes, such as the number of people rescued and the sum total of 
medical treatment, the Korean government did not get many desired outcomes in response to 
the Haiti earthquake mainly due to the time lag of initial response. The 1
st
 KDR team, led by 
the search and rescue staff, failed to deploy in Haiti within 48 hours of the occurrence of the 
earthquake as recommended by the INSARAG Guidelines (UN OCHA, 2012b), and this 
resulted in no saving of lives, only the collection of 33 of corpse at the site of the earthquake 
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(NEMA, 2010). In relation to this, Table 5.3 has a significant implication for search and 
rescue operations to perform life rescue work.  
Table 5.3 Status of people rescued by USAR teams in the Haiti earthquake 
Country Arrival day 
after the earthquake 
Scale of 
USAR team 
Rescued people Total of 
rescued people 
U.S.A. 1 75 10 25 
France 1 73 8 
Island 1 36 3 
Panama 1 22 3 
Spain 1 17 1 
Colombia 1 33 0 
Turkey 2 9 5 10 
U.K. 2 64 3 
Peru 2 9 2 
Republic of Dominica 2 12 0 
China 2 50 0 
Russia 3 44 4 7 
Netherland 3 63 3 
Germany 3 22 0 
Poland 3 56 0 
Republic of Korea 5 25 0 0 
Italy 5 5 0 
(Source: adapted from www.unocha.org January 18, 2010 at 06:00) 
 
The 1
st
 KDR arrived in the field on July 17 at 16:30 (local time) 5 days after the occurrence 
of the earthquake on January 12 at 16:53 because it took about 2 days for the departure and 
about 3 days in transit, and this also did not meet the essential requirements for emergency 
medical care during the first 48 hours (WHO & PAHO, 2003). The 2
nd
 KDR of 18 staff 
members, led by medical support unit, departed on January 20 and started to perform medical 
services on January 22, which was 10 days after the occurrence of the earthquake. The 2
nd
 
KDR treated a total of 1,326 patients during its operation, and the main treatments were for 
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chronic diseases like cold, stomach pain, genital itching, vaginal discharge and headache, and 
did not take care of critically injured patients (KOFIH, 2010).  
 
The dispatched KDR teams experienced the lack of support staff in the field, which seriously 
undermined the KDR teams’ capacity to respond to the disaster and this was identified in the 
focus group interviews with the rescue and medical staff who operated in the Haiti 
earthquake. The consequence of this was a serious hindrance to the KDR teams’ effective 
functioning and included problems such as: staff received insufficient support from the 
Korean government; rescue and medical staff had to resolve the problems of dining and 
residence by themselves and had to do the various tasks of equipment check-up and medicine 
classification after relief work themselves; also, there was no adequate facilities of billets, 
sanitation and shower (Ahn et al., 2010). Logistics was also confirmed in the focus group 
interviews as an area of weakness both in terms of accommodation for the KDR teams to stay 
and of support when considering the availability of personal deployment kits including 
camping and survival gear. The rescue and medical staff of the KDR teams had to spend a 
substantial amount of time on routine administration and housekeeping tasks, leaving little 
time for providing programmatic operations to save lives and treat patients (Ahn et al., 2010). 
Logistics for humanitarian response is a complicated mission seeking for the mobilization 
and deployment of the necessary resources to foster an effective response for the population 
affected by disasters or crises. The well-timed and safe supply of material and equipment to 
the crisis area is thus one of the most critical elements of the success of any emergency 
response operation (UNDP, 2009). 
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Following the Report of the Dispatch of the KDR Medical Team to the Haiti Earthquake 
(KOFIH, 2010), the 18 respondents of the total of 25 medical staff members of the KDR team 
were asked to what degree were they satisfied with their activities in Haiti. They were asked 
to rate a range of items on a five point scale (1=‘not at all satisfied’, 2=‘not very satisfied’, 
3=‘somewhat satisfied’, 4=‘very satisfied’, 5=‘extremely satisfied’). Packing and 
transportation of medical supplies (2.4), preparedness of medical supplies and equipment (2.8) 
and scale and structure of medical team (3) were very low in satisfaction of the respondents. 
In addition, the overall condition including safety and security (3.4) and the selection of 
operation area (3.4) were also relatively low in satisfaction. In relation to this point, Koido et 
al. (2000) suggested that the choice of the site for medical operations has a big influence on 
the outcome of the relief activities as seen in the experiences of the JDR in the 1999 Taiwan 
earthquake. Based on the assessment of the degree of satisfaction of participants in the Haiti 
operation, the KOFIH (2010) thus proposed the sufficient field support, including greater 
preparedness, the establishment of effective communication between headquarter and the 
field, the improvement of transportation and the participation of chefs in order to facilitate the 
highest capacity of the KDR team in emergency response operations. 
 
Furthermore, the members of the KDR team were sent to the field without sufficient 
information and deployed without and terms of reference or job description (KOFIH, 2010). 
Some of these problems were identified in the focus group interviews, such as: location and 
scale of casualties; information dealing the local architectural style and collapsed building; 
local health capacity such as medical personnel, facilities and equipments; state of local 
government to respond to the Haiti earthquake and the major contact point in Haiti. In view 
of the induction and briefing of staff,  the KDR teams did not manage well this in the Haiti 
response, which had been built in MOFAT’s Strategic Framework for Overseas Emergency 
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Relief, issued in 2008, and the KOICA’s SOP of Overseas Emergency Relief, issued in 2006. 
However, an attempt to solve some of the problems mentioned above has been made by the 
Korean government after the response. A stockpile of the medical and rescue equipment and 
the recruitment of chefs has been set up by the Plan, which is the self-reflection on the 
response to the Haiti earthquake (NEMA, 2011b). UN OCHA has further recommended to 
the KDR that having an effective underpinning legislation and policy, it is important that all 
the entities that compose the KDR are well integrated and have processes that standardise 
procedures for internal information sharing and coordination in order to effectively engage 
these entities. The different practices of these entities should also be synchronized in areas 
such as administrative preparations, training, and implementation of standard operational 
procedures (NEMA, 2011a). 
 
In the light of the criterion of producing desired outcomes, the programme domain of Korea’s 
response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake may be described as a precarious programme success 
because of the smaller number of lives saved and medical services performed than anticipated. 
Though the KDR did contribute to the Haiti response through its rescue and medical activities, 
it resulted in only 33 corpses being collected and mostly treated chronic diseases not patients 
injured by the earthquake. This was mainly caused by the time lag of initial response, the 
human composition of the KDR teams and the lack of support for the staff deployed in the 
field. 
 
5.4 Meeting Policy Domain Criteria 
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Even though not all policy sectors have values that are greatly accepted by its community of 
actors, such values may serve an important role as standards or benchmarks and thus build 
“indicators of success in that policy domain” (McConnell, 2010a, p. 48). In the humanitarian 
response sector, for example, INSARAG Guidelines (UN OCHA, 2012a) provides guidance 
for the deployment of USAR teams for international disaster response operations in major 
disasters, and WHO-PAHO Guidelines (WHO & PAHO, 2003) clarifies the timing of the 
supply of initial emergency medical care and also outlines essential requirements for field 
hospitals used for emergency medical services in natural or complex disasters. 
 
The 1
st
 KDR team, led by search and rescue specialists, arrived in the field about five days 
after the occurrence of the earthquake, even though the INSARAG Guidelines recommends 
that USAR teams “should be operated in the affected country within 48 hours of the posting 
of the disaster” on the Virtual OSOCC (UN OCHA, 2012a, p. 34). The 2nd KDR team, led by 
medical staff, arrived in the field about 10 days after the earthquake, and thus treated not 
acute but chronic disease patients. The WHO/PAHO Guidelines (WHO & PAHO, 2003) 
identifies that the period of the provision of early emergency medical care lasts only up to 48 
hours following the onset of an event. Also, another guideline of WHO-PAHO  (2010), 
which proposes the minimum standards for the use of foreign medical teams in disasters, 
emphasizes the principles of accountability, quality control, reporting, coordination, demand 
and needs assessment, logistics and registration, all of which have many implications for 
humanitarian action.  
 
In addition, the 2
nd
 KDR team had a big problem in handover. When it came to replace the 1
st
 
KDR team, the 2
nd
 KDR team could not take over its medical supplies and clinic because the 
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1
st
 KDR team had donated them to the local hospital of L’Hospital de la Communatute 
Haitienne without checking whether the 2
nd
 KDR team would be deployed or not (KOICA, 
2011a). This caused the problem of buying medical equipment and supplies in Dominica and 
delayed the start of medical treatment. Operational continuity is very important in rosters 
meant for post-surge deployment where it is expected that people would be deployed for 
longer than a few weeks (Bhattacharjee & Lossio, 2011). Also, the WHO highlights four core 
principles for health care equipment donations and drug donations: maximum benefit to the 
recipient; respect for the wishes and authority of the recipient; no double standards in quality; 
and effective communication between donor and recipient (WHO, 1999, 2000).  
 
Furthermore, the interaction between the KDR teams and the Haiti government and other 
humanitarian actors, such as UN OCHA, clusters and other humanitarian organizations was 
poor and there was no clear guidance on how the KDR teams would relate to them. The 
OSOCC reception centre, established by a United Nations Disaster Assessment Coordination 
(UNDAC) team “when there are major international search and rescue operations to be 
coordinated” in response to most disasters so as to deal with civil-military coordination (UN 
OCHA, 2007, p. 12), was set up in the early days of disaster management to provide 
information to all humanitarian actors, and clusters were also activated within the first three 
days after the earthquake  (Bhattacharjee & Lossio, 2011). However, the KDR teams did not 
have any practical participation in these activities or have close relationships with them 
(KOICA, 2011a), even though they were perceived as being very useful (Bhattacharjee & 
Lossio, 2011). In addition, many interviewees, including an advisor of the WHO, a director 
of the Haitian government and a staff of the UN OCHA, pointed out that coordination was a 
big problem and they could not deal with all of the activities of international relief teams in 
Haiti because of their huge numbers and varieties (KOICA, 2011a). Bhattacharjee and Lossio 
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(2011, p. 28) further pointed out that the problem of coordination in the humanitarian sector 
is unmanageable and almost impossible to solve because it is a general phenomenon that 
hundreds of agencies come to the field, especially after a quick onset natural disaster, and 
there is also insufficient guidance on how to manage “non-professional humanitarian 
organizations, private citizens groups, religious organizations etc., which have little 
understanding of and commitment to humanitarian coordination”. Taking this into account, 
the INSARAG Guidelines recommends international USAR teams to register the availability 
of all teams that participate on the virtual OSOCC and to participate in the OSOCC meetings 
regarding USAR operations so as to foster humanitarian relief in cooperation with relevant 
organizations (UN OCHA, 2012b).  
 
On the third criterion of meeting policy domain criteria, the programme dimension of Korea’s 
response constitutes an outright programme failure because Korea did not meet the criteria of 
the INSARAG Guidelines and the WHO-PAHO Guidelines in the dispatch of a search and 
rescue team and a medical team in the earthquake-stricken area. Though these guidelines 
highlight that both search and rescue operations and the provision of medical services should 
be conducted within 48 hours following the onset of disasters, the KDR teams failed to meet 
the guidelines due to their late arrival in the field affected by the earthquake. They also did 
not do well in the aspect of handover between the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 KDR teams as well as with 
cooperation with the Haitian government, UN OCHA and other humanitarian actors in the 
earthquake struck area, due to the lack of guidance and poor recognition of the international 
cooperation required, in consideration of the relevant guidelines. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
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Regarding the programme dimension of the response, precarious success seems the most 
appropriate term for taking into account the assessment of one conflicted programme success, 
one precarious programme successes and one outright programme failure. Though there was 
some degree of help to Haiti by dispatching the KDR teams, which was the first Korean 
corporate response as it combined a search and rescue team and a medical team in order to 
enhance their capacity for emergency relief, the response did not meet many objectives or 
produce desired outcomes, and failed to meet policy domain criteria. It did not much achieve 
the objectives of providing rapid rescue and relief for Haitians affected due to the problems 
with leadership, human resources and mobilization of the KDR teams. In addition, the KDR 
teams did not much bring about desired outcomes, including life-saving and medical 
treatment, because of the time lag of initial response and a lack of support from Korea. 
Furthermore, the response failed to follow the standards of the humanitarian sector, for 
example, INSARAG and WHO-PAHO Guidelines, due to the late arrival in the disaster field 
and the problem of handover between the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 KDR teams. 
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Chapter 6 - Evaluation of the Political Dimension 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
The political dimension of policy is with reference to “government, its capacity to govern, the 
values it seeks to promote and so on” (McConnell, 2010a, p. 50). The choices of government 
including timing of decisions and particular forms of action or inaction take effect on its 
ability to deal with its political agenda (McConnell, 2010b). In relation to this, crisis events 
can further form “policy trajectories, governmental agendas … institutional reputations and 
even the veracity of governing and societal paradigms” (McConnnell, 2011, p. 67). Taking 
these points into account in the Haiti case, this thesis explores the Plan for the Advancement 
of Overseas Emergency Relief (MOFAT, 2010) (hereafter the Plan), the significant success 
of the response to the 2011 Japan earthquake, changes to humanitarian aid budgets, the 
cooperation with other humanitarian actors, and media coverage. 
 
In terms of evaluating the political dimension of policy, one measure is sustaining the broad 
values and direction of government. It seems reasonable to say that if policies promote the 
values coveted by governments and are useful to retain the wide trajectory of government and 
its programmes, they might be considered successful in the political dimension. Another 
criterion is controlling the policy agenda and easing the business of governing. Finally, the 
criteria can be based on the idea that opposition to political benefits for government is 
virtually non-existent (McConnell, 2010a). 
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6.2 Sustaining the Broad Values and Direction of Government.  
 
It appears to be possible that if a policy assists the shaping of new values and new pathways, 
it might be politically successful. In relation to this, McConnell argues that “A variation on 
this category of sustaining government trajectory relates to the situation where a government 
explicitly wants to change direction” (2010a, p. 53). Although the Haiti response was far 
from being a program success, and is in fact considered to be a precarious programme 
success, the response was nevertheless effective in sustaining the broad values and direction 
of government. In view of this, this section investigates the Plan, for example, the use of 
military aircraft, the achievements of the United Nations INSARAG External Classification 
(UN IEC), the introduction of a field hospital and the utilization of the World Food 
Program’s humanitarian response depots, and the success of the response to the 2011 Japan 
earthquake. 
 
After reviewing its response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake, Korea adopted the Plan in May 
2010, so as to improve the capacity of the government’s response in overseas disaster relief 
operations. The Plan covers most of the issues raised in the prior chapters of evaluation: 
faster decision-making by calling an inter-ministry emergency meeting within 24 hours after 
the occurrence of disasters; quick dispatch of the KDR team by setting up the principle of 
deploying search and rescue and other relief teams contingent on the possibility of 
dispatching the team within 72 hours; the increase of leadership and human resources by 
dispatching MOFAT officers to the field so as to manage response operations and by 
strengthening the pool of experts (Government of the Republic of Korea, 2012). Korea also 
amended the Overseas Emergency Relief Act and its enforcement ordinance (Government of 
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the Republic of Korea, 2007) (hereafter, the Act) in 2011, and these efforts thus brought 
about an advanced architecture of overseas emergency relief and an extensive measure for 
quick response (OECD, 2012). 
 
The lessons learnt from the Haiti response together with the Plan brought a new direction to 
overseas emergency relief as well as a significant result regarding the 2011Japan earthquake 
response. In the earthquake of Japan, Korea dispatched a KDR team, led by the search and 
rescue staff, first of all in foreign relief agencies by transporting the team and relief goods in 
five C-130 military aircraft (Government of the Republic of Korea, 2012). An advance team 
of the KDR consisting of five rescue specialists departed on March 12, 2011 at 12:15 and its 
main team departed on March 14 at 08:10 and landed at Japan’s Narita airport at 10:50. The 
107 members of the KDR, including two coordinators of MOFAT, six medical staff members 
and eight support staff members, provided humanitarian aid, such as search and rescue 
activities and relief goods supply, to Japan after a magnitude 8.9 earthquake occurred on 
March 11 at 14:46 (KOICA, 2011a). The efforts of joint simulation exercise for utilizing 
military aircraft, the enlargement of the Korea Search and Rescue (KOSAR) team and the 
cooperation of related agencies brought these results (Jin, 2011). The MOFAT led a joint 
simulation exercise for overseas disaster response in May 2010 in order to resolve the 
transportation and logistics problems of the Haiti response. The exercise especially focused 
on the utilization of military aircraft, and the Standard Operational Procedure of Overseas 
Emergency Response was set up in July 2010 by MOFAT (Jin, 2011). In the future Korea 
will utilize military aircrafts, in particular, “in crises in 15 Asian countries based on a special 
manual drafted through consultation across all concerned ministries” (Government of the 
Republic of Korea, 2012, p. 47) so as to foster the efficient transportation of relief goods and 
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the KDR team. In addition, the KOSAR added 56 personnel of local government firefighters 
in July 2010 to enlarge its capacity and 44 personnel of them were then deployed in the Japan 
response (NEMA, 2011b). The Plan and the amendment of the Act have built a solid inter-
government cooperation for disaster response based on lessons learned from Korea’s 
response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake (OECD, 2012). As a result of the above mentioned 
efforts, the Korean government response to the 2011 Japan earthquake has become a good 
exemplar of overseas emergency response because the response was the first case of using 
military aircraft for the mobilization and demobilization of the KDR staff members, the 
deployment of an advance team for information collection and needs assessment and 
dispatching local government firefighters in overseas emergency relief.  
 
However, there is a significant issue of the use regarding military assets in response to 
humanitarian crises. In response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake, twenty-six countries, for 
example, Canada, the Dominican Republic and the US, utilized military assets, including 
military aircraft, field hospitals, troops, hospital ships and helicopters  (Bhattacharjee & 
Lossio, 2011). From the experience of the 2004 Asian tsunami and the 2010 Haiti earthquake, 
the use of military assets might be important for saving lives in these non-conflict events, and 
increasingly the military of foreign governments is getting engaged in humanitarian 
interventions especially after natural disasters (Bhattacharjee & Lossio, 2011). In relation to 
this, Shiras warns that “intended or not, the presence of a large military force, and the 
political decisions about how to use the force, can easily overwhelm, distort, and work at 
cross purposes to the achievement of humanitarian objectives” (Collebatch, Hoppe, & 
Noordegraff, 2010, p. 96). The Oslo Guidelines thus recommends that the use of military and 
civil defence assets (MCDA) in natural disaster should follow the basic humanitarian 
principles of humanity, impartiality, independence and neutrality and also emphasizes the 
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principle of last resort, which requires that “foreign MCDA should be requested only where 
there is no comparable civilian alternative and only the use of military or civil defence assets 
can meet a critical humanitarian need” (Hallam, 1997, p. 4). 
 
As the Plan states the introduction of mobile clinics and the packing in advance of medical 
equipment (Government of the Republic of Korea, 2012), Korea have equipped with a field 
hospital which can provide early emergency medical care in disaster fields, and packages of 
medical equipment to rapidly respond to emergencies (Lee et al., 2012, pp. 341-345). The 
WHO-PAHO Guidelines (2003, p. 6) identify a field hospital as a “mobile, self-contained, 
self-sufficient health care facility capable of rapid deployment and expansion or contraction 
to meet immediate emergency requirements for a specified period of time”. It can thus 
substitute for or complement the medical systems in the disaster fields. Furthermore, the 
KOICA made a technology agreement with the World Food Programme in April 2012 to 
utilize the hubs of the United Nations Humanitarian Response Depot, which enables Korea to 
procure rapidly and cost-effectively emergency supplies for distant countries by utilizing five 
depots: Europe (Brindisi / Italy), Africa (Accra / Ghana), Latin America (Panama City / 
Panama), South East (Subang / Malaysia), and Middle East (Dubai / UAE) (Lee et al., 2012). 
To foster the rapid and reliable supply of the large-volume of relief items, reserve supplies 
must be procured and appropriately stockpiled in advance at locations as strategically spread 
out as possible to ensure quick supply anywhere in the world.  
 
In view of the first criterion of sustaining the broad values and direction of government, the 
research finds that there is an outright process success because the accomplishment of the 
Plan has improved the capacity of Korea in overseas emergency response, which has led to 
the success of forging new values and new pathways (McConnell, 2010a), and thus caused a 
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significant result in response to the 2011 Japan earthquake. Based on the Plan, the self-
reflection on the response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake, Korea has enhanced its capacity to 
perform overseas emergency relief by the expansion of the KOSAR, the use of military 
aircraft and the set-up of field hospital and overseas warehouses for emergency response.  
 
6.3 Controlling the Policy Agenda and Easing the Business of Governing  
 
Governments often confront difficult situations, such as the limitation of resources at their 
disposal, and a phase of the business of government thus includes “producing programmes 
that might arguably leave much to be desired in terms of dealing with policy problems, but 
help sustain its capacity to govern” (McConnell, 2010a, p. 51). Therefore, a program might 
be suggested as a political success if it maintains a public impression of managing the issue, 
such as the formation of a new programme, or the achievement of support from significant 
actors (McConnell, 2010a). In view of this, this section examines the changes in humanitarian 
aid budgets, the issue of linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) and the 
cooperation with other humanitarian actors, such as NGOs and international organizations. 
 
Taking into account the official humanitarian aid budget, Korea’s budget considerably 
increased from US$ 11 million in 2008 to US$ 26 million in 2012, an increase of more than 
230%. It will further increase in the run up to 2015 in order to meet the augmenting demand 
for humanitarian aid considering the frequent occurrence of big natural disasters as the total 
official development assistance (ODA) budget is anticipated to grow (Government of the 
Republic of Korea, 2012). However, the humanitarian aid budget is only an average of 2.6% 
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of Korea’s total ODA budget and the figure is thus quite lower than the DAC average. To fill 
the gap, Korea has committed to expanding the humanitarian budget to 6% of the ODA 
budget (OECD, 2012). In relation to this, OECD (2012) further points out the issue of linking 
relief to development phases in the peer review of Korea. Though its humanitarian budget 
provides multilateral recovery measurements, recovery is not yet a basic component of 
Korea’s humanitarian programmes, and the lack of LRRD is considerable in the strategy of 
its humanitarian assistance. When a big crisis occurs, the issue of LRRD becomes part of the 
political agenda (VOICE & CONCORD, 2012). The approach of LRRD emphasizes the 
interaction among the triangle of humanitarian aid (short-term), reconstruction/rehabilitation 
(midterm) and development cooperation (long-term) in order to promote complementarity 
and coherence (Swiss Red Cross, 2010). The VOICE and CONCORD (2012, p. 3) 
emphasizes that “LRRD needs sustained political commitment over time, rather than only 
when a large disaster hits” and also calls for coordination and interdisciplinary work between 
governments and NGOs. Therefore, OECD (2012, p. 92) recommends that Korea should 
clarify its role of supporting the recovery phase and lay out “how (or if) it will support the 
preparedness and resilience of at-risk communities through the humanitarian budget”. 
 
In addition, in response to the Haiti earthquake, KDR’s short-term humanitarian relief did not 
link well with NGOs and their activities such as World Vision Korea and Good Neighbors 
and Task Force Danbi of the Republic of Korea’s sixth UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) 
regarding midterm reconstruction and rehabilitation because there was no clear guidance on 
how these actors would connect emergency relief to recovery and development. In relation to 
this, an official of Task Force Danbi who was interviewed commented that: “when the short-
term humanitarian relief efforts connect to the midterm reconstruction and rehabilitation, the 
efforts will improve the living condition of the affected population and increase the 
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satisfaction of the recipients”. Reconstruction seeks to stabilize food supplies, repair and 
reconstruct health and education facilities, rebuild economic and social infrastructure, and 
facilitate industrial rehabilitation over an extended period of time (Park, 2010). Much like 
other informants interviewed, Souvenise, a Haitian informant, stated that her needs in terms 
of food, clean water, sanitation, shelter, household items and health care were the same at the 
time of the interview as they had been in the time acute phase of the earthquake and 
prioritized having a home, food and education in that order as her greatest needs. The 
characteristics of humanitarian aid, peacebuilding and reconstruction missions to a large 
extent make military and civilian actors simultaneously work in the same place. There are 
many problems in cooperation between military forces and civilian relief organizations, even 
though there is increasing acceptance of broadening operational needs. The problem, Franke 
(2006, p. 6) observes, is “the cultural, organizational, and normative differences that hamper 
coordination between civilian and military actors in the field”. Notwithstanding the primary 
differences in structure and approach between civilian and military actors, there is a possible 
way to foster effective and meaningful cooperation. It is a careful division of labour grounded 
on the comparative merits of civilian and military sectors. The military has relative 
advantages in the ability to provide security, logistic capacity and a strong sense of discipline; 
on the contrary, humanitarian agencies have advantage in their experience in working 
together with other civilian actors and knowledge of the region and established relationships 
with the local community (Franke, 2006; KOICA, 2011a). 
 
In light of partnerships between the public-private sector, Korea has significantly progressed 
in recent years. With the increasing role of the civilian organizations in overseas disaster 
relief efforts, the Korean government devised the public-private action plan for humanitarian 
assistance in December 2011 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Korea, 2013). In 
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2012, based on the Plan, which is the self-reflection on the response to the 2010 Haiti 
earthquake, the Korean government has made agreements with eight major NGOs regarding 
their capacities to assist and their experience in overseas emergency relief so as to work 
together in response to overseas emergencies (Government of the Republic of Korea, 2012). 
This scheme provides an annual envelope of US$ 200,000 for each NGO, which may foster 
the timeliness and the predictability of the overall Korean response (OECD, 2012). In 
addition, Korea has upgraded its humanitarian aid to be more need-based and more aligned to 
global standards in order to make sure of its effectiveness. To foster the effectiveness of 
humanitarian relief, response should be accomplished promptly and under close relationships 
with international organizations and the affected countries. Korea is using either international 
(UN OCHA, IFRC or NGOs) or bilateral (via Korean embassies or KOICA country offices) 
needs assessments to determine the needs of affected countries (Government of the Republic 
of Korea, 2012). Korea has closely cooperated with the UNDAC, an international emergency 
response system. In November 2011, the Korea National 119 Rescue Services achieved the 
heavy-class qualification for its overseas disaster relief operations as a certification of the 
quality management of humanitarian aid (Hilhorst, 2002), which is the highest qualification 
level accredited by the INSARAG (Government of the Republic of Korea, 2012).  
 
In light of another criterion for controlling the policy agenda and easing the business of 
governing, the political facet is also described as a durable political success because of the 
increase in the official humanitarian aid budget, the enhancement of the partnership between 
the public-private sector and the increase in the cooperation with international organizations. 
The political facet has formed a new programme and also achieved support from significant 
actors, even though there are minor problems, such as the issues of LRRD and the 
cooperation between civil and military actors. 
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6.4 Opposition to Political Benefits for Government is Virtually Non-existent  
 
A crisis management initiative can be politically successful if it wins the public relations war. 
Therefore, the political success demands the initiative “attract universal or near universal 
support for the political implications and/no or virtually no opposition” (McConnnell, 2011, p. 
70). Considering this, this section mainly explores the media coverage of the Haiti response, 
focusing on the activities of the KDR and the relationship between the government and the 
media.  
 
Even though Korea’s response to the Haiti earthquake was highlighted by the media covering 
the activities of the KDR teams, the media sometimes hindered the teams’ activities with a 
burden of supporting their news gathering. The major media outlets of Korea, such as KBS, 
MBC and YTN, publicized many times the activities of KDR in the earthquake-stricken area 
(NEMA, 2010). The Haitian media also reported on Korea’s assistance to the population, 
which raised the image of Korea as a donor country (KOICA, 2011a) and most of the local 
Haitians interviewed by the research team expressed deep gratitude to the international 
community, including the Korean government. The media are taking an increasingly 
significant part in reporting humanitarian crises, and the advancement of technology has 
strengthened the immediacy of their publication (Rotberg & Weiss, 1996). With reference to 
the relationship between media and international emergency response, Olsen et al. (2003, p. 
110) argues that “massive media coverage of a humanitarian crisis will lead to increased 
allocations of emergency funds, whereby humanitarian needs have a better chance of being 
met”. Furthermore, media coverage of disasters deeply influences both public opinion and the 
policy-making process and can also play a crucial role in raising resources, as Congress is 
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pressured to expand its budget on the disaster response (Natsios, 1996). The expansion of 
real-time communication technology increased the power of the media and the power of 
media promoted humanitarian concern from the domestic audience and political elites for 
global events, which is the so-called CNN effect. Many studies have evidenced this effect in 
humanitarian crises (Robinson, 1999, 2005).  
 
During the dispatch of the KDR teams to Haiti, many Korean media outlets competitively 
mobilized reporters and vied in covering the scene in order to report a special case to the 
public. A reporter who had covered the Haiti earthquake and was thus interviewed by the 
research team, commented that: “Overseas emergency situations are good material for media 
to find a source for reporting because both emergency assistance agencies and emergency 
relief staff have a strong demand for public relations”. Many reporters wanted to cover 
activities on site and often competed with each other for exclusive news and this thus placed 
an increased pressure on the KDR team who needed to support the daily necessities for the 
reporters in the disaster fields. Therefore, KDR’s burden of supporting them increased and 
the media sometimes hindered the activities of the KDR (KOICA, 2011a). The media of the 
twenty-first century arrive on the disaster field within hours, and start portraying the situation 
immediately and thus affect how the world respond to a disaster (Bhattacharjee & Lossio, 
2011). Both the media and relief agencies have interests that are sometimes in conflict about 
how to depict to an exact picture of emergencies. Aid organizations’ interest lie in presenting 
vividly the urgent character of and needs engaged in an event; on the contrary, “journalists 
want their stories to air or appear in print. Therefore, the more sensational the story, the 
greater its chances for publication” (Shiras, 1996, p. 110). Even so, the significance of the 
media’s role in publicizing overseas crises and its positive effect on organizing an 
international response to disaster should be recognized (Shiras, 1996). In the Plan (MOFAT, 
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2010), the deputy director of the assistance unit of the KDR team manages the information of 
its activities in order to unify external communication. Korea further needs to build a system 
in which the KDR collaborates with the media so that they are not disturbing its operations 
and to insure that a public information/media relations officer is deployed on the scene in any 
emergency as one of the first-priority deployments. 
 
On the third criterion of opposition to political benefits for the government, opposition is 
virtually non-existent, but this political facet still constitutes a conflicted political success 
because Korea did not well manage the media, even though KDR’s activities received media 
focus and the praises of media in response to the Haiti earthquake. Korea has to be concerned 
over collaboration with the media in order to foster a greater humanitarian response, even 
though the relationship among policy-makers, humanitarian organizations and the media are 
complicated or chaotic (Rotberg & Weiss, 1996). 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
The political dimension of Korea’s response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake seems best 
captured within the framework of a durable political success. Though it has a conflicted 
political success related to the media, the politics well maintained new values and a new path 
by following the Plan, including the utilization of military aircraft and the introduction of a 
field hospital, the scheme of partnership between the public-private sectors, and the steady 
increase of humanitarian budget. However, it did not well deal with the relationship between 
the KDR and the media, and there are some considerable issues regarding LRRD and the 
cooperation between the civil sectors and the military sectors that need to be addressed to 
improve overall capacity of Korea in the humanitarian field.  
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Chapter 7 – Conclusion 
 
7.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter discusses the results presented in chapters Four, Five and Six, which assessed 
the three dimensions of policy: process, programme and politics, and revisits the arguments 
set out in this thesis. This thesis aimed to apply McConnell’s approach to the case of Korea’s 
response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake, because the DAC-OECD criteria (ALNAP, 2006; 
DAC-OECD, 1999), the dominant evaluation framework in the humanitarian field, was of 
limited utility in the evaluation of the case as mentioned Chapter 1. This research has also 
proposed a research question: To what extent can Korea’s response to the 2010 Haiti 
earthquake be described as successful? In seeking an answer to this, the research has explored 
whether McConnell’s theory may fill the gaps left by the current approaches for humanitarian 
evaluation. This is based on the argument of George and Bennett (2005, p. 74) that single-
case studies might be useful “if they pose a “tough test” for theories or identify alternative 
causal paths to similar outcomes when equifinality is present”. 
 
This chapter is structured in the following way. Firstly, the major findings of the result 
chapters are brought together to better understand the whole picture of the evaluation and 
themes contained in the chapters are linked to the major literature. Secondly, a discussion of 
the unexpected findings from the evaluation is presented. Thirdly, the contributions of this 
thesis are discussed, and the chapter concludes with some suggestions for future study that 
would further develop McConnell’s theory as a model for evaluating humanitarian action. 
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7.2 Applying McConnell’s framework to evaluating humanitarian aid 
 
This thesis has sought to develop an alternative approach to evaluating humanitarian action in 
order to make the gaps left by the current approaches smaller. The application of 
McConnell’s theory to the case of Korea’s response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake has 
provided a deeper understanding of the subject than have pre-existing approaches to the 
evaluation of humanitarian response. Through this case study, McConnell’s approach has 
provided a broader perspective on the evaluation of Korea’s response by assessing these three 
dimensions of the response: process, programme and politics. In particular, the political 
dimension was relatively better understood and the degree of success or failure of the 
response was relatively easier to determine than when using the DAC-OECD criteria, 
currently the mostly widely used framework in the humanitarian sector. 
 
This research has challenged two issues in the recent debate about evaluation. The first has 
been the general difficulties of policy analysis, whereas the second is the specific problems of 
evaluating humanitarian action. Each of these issues has its roots in the scientific and 
positivistic perspective of the traditional approach in policy sciences. The difficulties of 
policy analysis are: how to incorporate success as a fact, for example, the achievement of 
objectives and outcomes, and success as perception, such as the issue of success for whom; 
how to involve political aspect of policy; and how to determine the degree of success or 
failure of policy (McConnell, 2010a). The problems of evaluating humanitarian assistance are 
how to assess the operational as well as the strategic aspects of a project and how to evaluate 
within the various contexts of humanitarian crises (Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002). To alleviate 
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these issues, the research has applied McConnell’s framework to the Korea case which has 
already been measured by the standard DAC-OECD framework (KOICA, 2011a). 
 
This research divided Korea’s response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake into the three realms of 
process, program and politics for analytical purposes and also for determining the degrees of 
success and failure within these realms by following McConnell’s theory (2010b). In contrast, 
KOICA (2011a) utilized the three aspects of system, preparedness and response in regard to 
disaster response processes in its assessment of the same case studied in this research, so as to 
improve Korea’s response ability in light of past experience. This division of the research 
into process, programme and politics has allowed us to catch some of the characteristics and 
dynamics of humanitarian response among these divisions (McConnell, 2010b). 
 
In the researcher’s experience, McConnell’s framework has more benefits than the DAC-
OECD criteria do in assessing humanitarian aid. His framework was firstly more successful 
in assessing the political aspect of the response, based on the argument of the revisionist 
approach, “policy evaluation is an inherently normative act, a matter of political judgement” 
(2006, p. 319) than the prior evaluation which employed the dominant framework of the 
DAC-OECD criteria which is the scientific or positivistic perspective of traditional approach 
(Bovens et al., 2006; Dunn, 2004; KOICA, 2011a). His framework has also provided working 
definitions of success and failure, which has a number of analytical benefits for policy or 
project evaluation. An   important point for analysis is that the definitions involve a fact in 
view of the rational approach, such as “government meeting its goals” (McConnell, 2010a, p. 
39); and recognition,  in relation to the argumentative approach, for example, 
“actors/interests/groups benefiting (McConnell, 2010a, p. 39). In contrast, as a dominant 
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standard framework for humanitarian evaluation, the DAC-OECD criteria has a set of 
limitations. One limitation is the failure to take into account the full context of humanitarian 
crises, because the criteria focus on objective assessment, not on interpretation or interest 
(Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002). It also fails to evaluate the interests or perceptions of stakeholders 
because of the framework’s strong division of fact and value (Bovens et al., 2006). 
Furthermore, the application of McConnell’s framework to the Korea’s case has made the 
evaluation of humanitarian aid easier, through the provision of detailed criteria and a 
continuum from success to failure. When it comes to evaluating humanitarian assistance, the 
lack of detailed criteria causes the problem of suitability of the criteria for assessing each case, 
a problem encountered by evaluation teams during the assessment of the same case when 
employing the orthodox framework, currently the mostly widely accepted framework in 
humanitarian evaluation. A continuum from success to failure has provided criteria and 
guidance for determining the degree of success and failure of the response and thus allows us 
to solve the problem of subjectivity in assessment. Therefore, his framework may be a richer 
tool for the evaluation of humanitarian assistance, based on the researcher’s experience of 
applying two evaluation frameworks to the same case, Korea’s response to the 2010 Haiti 
earthquake. 
 
In summary, McConnell’s theory might be more helpful for us to alleviate the difficulties and 
complexities of humanitarian evaluation than the current approaches for humanitarian 
assistance do. By providing the notions of success and failure, his theory incorporates success 
as both a fact and interpretation. His theory also divides policy or project into three domains, 
including politics, and thus assesses the overall structure of policy domain. Moreover, a 
spectrum from success to failure has made it easier to determine various levels of success 
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among the process, programme and political domains of humanitarian assistance 
(McConnnell, 2011) 
 
7.3 Conflicts between different forms of success and/or failure  
 
This thesis has produced various results, across the success-failure continuum, from the 
evaluation of Korea’s response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake. To do this a judgement was 
needed to categorise policies or projects in specific levels of success and/or failure because 
“policy outcomes do not always have tidy results” (McConnell, 2010b, p. 357). This is well 
presented in the work of Wildavsky (1979, p. 3), “policy analysis is synonymous with 
creativity, which may be stimulated by theory and sharpened by practice, which can be 
learned but not taught”. The results in the thesis differed across the three dimensions: durable 
process success, precarious programme success and durable political success. Differences 
also occurred within a dimension: for example, outright political success; durable political 
success; and conflicted political success. Indeed, these differences are common in policy 
analysis in consideration of the argument of McConnell (2010b, p. 357), “Such trade-offs and 
tensions are at the heart of the dynamics of public policy”. This thesis has identified the 
conflict between precarious programme success and durable political success. The adherence 
to processes, the resolution of operational problems and the achievement of political success 
do not easily go along together in humanitarian aid or crisis management (McConnnell, 2011). 
To answer this problem we might think that “political success sometimes necessitates 
programs that leave much to be desired in terms of tackling policy problems” (McConnell, 
2010b, p. 357). We may also more easily understand this point in consideration of the three 
criteria of the political aspect. One criterion is sustaining the broad values and direction of 
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government. The second criterion is controlling the policy agenda and easing the business of 
governing. The third is that opposition to political benefits for government is virtually non-
existent. In reality, governments often take action to manage symptoms rather than solve the 
fundamental causes of problems. For governments, attempting to manage the issue and 
reacting to popular concerns gives them a facade of success, “whether or not the response 
effectively engages with a wicked problem” (McConnnell, 2011, p. 72). 
 
7.4 Significance of the thesis  
 
This thesis has made three main contributions to current research. First, it has contributed to 
the development of an alternative to the popular, standard evaluation approach to the 
humanitarian sector, the DAC-OECD criteria. What this pre-existing approach and others 
lack is the strategic aspects of humanitarian response and appropriate consideration of the 
complexity of the humanitarian context. In response, the application of McConnell’s 
framework in this research has made these gaps left by the current framework smaller by 
including the political aspect of policy and by incorporating success as a fact and success as 
interpretation in humanitarian evaluation, which might be useful for us to evaluate 
humanitarian aid. Second, it has offered a substantive evaluation of humanitarian assistance 
by expanding the scope of evaluation, as well as by using detailed criteria and a continuum 
from success and failure with the help of McConnell’s theory, which may help to solve the 
problem of subjectivity in evaluation. Third, by employing McConnell’s approach, the thesis 
has developed a distinct alternative analysis of Korea’s response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake 
as a case of evaluating humanitarian aid policy. 
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7.5 Further study 
 
McConnell’s framework employed in this thesis seems to provide a useful alternative to the 
standard DAC-OECD framework for the evaluation of humanitarian assistance. However, his 
framework necessarily remains open to the insights of the standard and other approaches to 
humanitarian evaluation. In other words, the framework provides a different view on the 
evaluation of humanitarian aid, but recognizes that elements of existing approaches also have 
relevant insights and have made important contributions. Indeed, to understand humanitarian 
evaluation more clearly, we also need to critically examine the interrelations between 
McConnell’s approach and the DAC-OECD criteria and other approaches.  
 
This thesis is a step towards a more systematic approach in understanding how we deal with 
humanitarian action. Therefore, further research that contributes to a more complete 
understanding of the approaches to humanitarian evaluation would be valuable. It would be 
interesting and valuable, also, to take McConnell’s approach and apply it to a range of cases, 
for example, other countries’ responses to humanitarian crises, and to use such evaluations 
with the intent of comparison to existing approaches. 
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Interview Protocol for Policy and Institutional Sectors 
1. The questions about the legal and institutional systems related to overseas emergency 
response. 
a. Are the systems appropriate for the consideration of the humanitarian needs and 
concerns of the population affected by disasters?  
ⅰ. If not, what improvements can be made? 
b. Do the systems include the requirement of connecting emergency relief activities with 
the midterm reconstruction and recovery phase? 
c. Do the systems sufficiently reflect the principles of humanitarianism, such as 
impartiality, independence and neutrality? 
d. Do the systems make good use of the knowledge gained from the past experiences of 
overseas emergency relief activities? 
2. The questions about the decision-making system related to overseas emergency response. 
a. Is the system appropriate for the consideration of the humanitarian needs and 
concerns of the population affected by disasters or crises?  
b. Do all the necessary agencies participate in the system? 
c. Does the system consider cross-cutting issues such as human rights, sexual equity, 
etc.? 
d. Does the system use the principle of priority in goal setting? 
e. Are there any unnecessary procedures or time-lag in procedures in the system, as 
evidenced from past experiences? 
ⅰ. If so, in what aspects of the system do problems occur? 
f. Does the system use the guidelines for the regulation and evaluation of the relevant 
agencies? 
ⅰ. If so, how effectively do the guidelines work? 
3. The questions about the budget and information collecting system related to overseas 
emergency relief. 
a. What do you think about the scale and trends of humanitarian budgets? 
b. In consideration of your experience, is the humanitarian aid budget allocated on the 
basis of humanitarian value? 
c. In consideration of your experience, do the information collection systems provide 
the vital information and data relevant to the needs and concerns of the population 
affected by disasters or emergencies? 
d. In consideration of your experience, what do you think about the accuracy and 
swiftness of the information-collection systems? Were there any problems? 
4. The questions about the structure and the dispatch plan of the Korea Disaster Relief Team 
(KDRT) related to overseas emergency operations. 
a. Are the structure and the plan capable of being adapted to the needs and concerns of 
the population affected by disasters?  
b. Do the structure and the plan consider the perspective of the midterm reconstruction 
and recovery phase of the countries affected by humanitarian crises? 
c. Do the structure and the plan sufficiently reflect the principles of humanitarianism, 
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such as impartiality, independence and neutrality?  
d. Do the structure and the plan give priority to different actions? 
ⅰ. If so, what do you think about the relevance of the priority given to action in the 
field? 
e. From your perspective, are the present guidelines, for example, the field manuals of 
KOICA, NRS and KOFIH, appropriate to the structure and the plan for responding to 
overseas disasters? 
ⅰ. If not, what is the problem? 
5. The questions about the resources (workforce, equipment, manuals, SOPs, etc.) and the 
inter-agency cooperation system related to overseas emergency relief activities. 
a. Are the resources appropriate for responding to various kinds of disasters and do they 
have the necessities for the midterm reconstruction and recovery phase? 
ⅰ. For example, do the field manuals for overseas emergency relief activities have 
detailed guidelines for responding to the many different situations and needs of 
humanitarian crises? 
ⅱ. For example, do the guidelines allow for the set-up of a workforce of medical staff 
who will work in the midterm reconstruction or recovery stages for the countries 
affected by disasters? 
b. Are the emergency response personnel well informed about humanitarianism, 
including its principles and practices? 
c. Is there any problem regarding the time lag from disaster occurrence to resource 
mobilization? 
d. What do you think about the safety and security of the personnel engaged in response 
activities? 
e. Is there any problem regarding the time lag in the instigation of cooperation between 
the inter-organizations involved in the humanitarian operations? 
f. Is there a coordinating structure for facilitating adequate integration of the relevant 
agencies? 
6. The questions about KDRT mobilization from past experiences. 
a. Did the KDRT set up measures to ensure the safety and security of staff? 
b. Was the transportation of KDRT’s personnel and equipment efficient? 
ⅰ. If not so, what was the problem and how can it be improved? 
c. Has there been any improvement in the mobilization and transit aspects of the KDRT 
as evidenced from past experience? 
7. The questions about KDRT operations from past experience. 
a. Did the KDRT operate effectively in response to the needs and concerns of the 
disaster field and its action plan? 
b. What do you think about the comprehensiveness and relevance of the KDRT’s 
operations? 
c. Was the coordination function of the KDRT rapid in light of goal setting and the 
changing process? 
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d. Did the KDRT achieve effective assistance in responding to overseas disasters when 
compared with the response of teams from other countries? 
e. What was the degree of satisfaction of the countries affected by disasters and the 
foreign government agencies relevant to the KDRT’s activities? 
f. What do you think about the ripple effect of the KDRT’s past deployments? 
8.  The questions about KDRT demobilization from past experiences. 
a. Did the KDRT consider the field situations in the demobilization? 
b. Did the KDRT consider the linkage of the short-term relief activities and the midterm 
recovery activities regarding equipment donation after the declaration of end of 
operation? 
c. In demobilization, did the KDRT have prior consultation with local agencies, other 
foreign disaster relief agencies, international organizations (UN, IFRC), etc.? 
9. Please feel free to make any additional comment. 
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Interview Protocol for Rescue and Medical Sectors 
1. Have you undertaken any training program related to overseas emergency relief? 
a. If so, which organization’s programme? 
b. If so, was it helpful for your activities in the Haiti response? 
c. Do you have any recommendations for that training programme? 
2. Did you utilize any manual relevant to rescue and medical sectors for your activities 
as a member of KDRT in the Haiti case? 
a. If so, did the manual have contents relevant for the rapid response to the concerns 
and needs of the Haiti field work? 
b. If so, did the manual have contents relevant for the effective utilization of 
resources (workforce, equipment, etc.) in the Haiti case? 
c. Do you have any recommendation for improving the manual? 
3. The questions about the KDRT mobilization in the Haiti case. 
a. What do you think about the 1st and 2nd KDRT responses in view of timing, 
structure and scale? 
b. Was the KDR teams’ equipment adequate for the response? 
c. Was the means of transportation appropriate for the movement of staff, equipment, 
etc., from Santo Domingo airport to Port-au Prince? If not, what was the problem? 
d. Was the base of operations in Haiti appropriate regarding location and function? 
e. Did you make any requests to the base of operations? 
ⅰ. If so, what did you think about the reply? 
f. What do you think about the safety and security issues of the KDRT in the Haiti 
case? 
ⅰ. How did the KDRT prepare for the occurrence of any secondary shocks? 
4. The questions about the KDRT’s operations in the Haiti response. 
a. What do you think about the accuracy and swiftness of the KDRT’s operations in 
relation to the concerns and needs in the Haiti field? 
b. Were the operations helpful to the recovery of the country or regions affected by 
the earthquake? 
c. What was the degree of satisfaction of the population affected by the earthquake 
as well as the foreign relief agencies deployed in Haiti regarding the KDRT’s 
operations? 
5. The questions about KDRT’s demobilization in the Haiti case.  
a. What do you think about the timing of the KDRT’s demobilization? 
b. What do you think about the consultation between the KDRT and the local 
agencies of the Haiti government regarding KDR team’s demobilization? 
6.  Please feel free to make any additional comment. 
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Generic Interview Protocol for the Haiti Response 
1. The questions about the relevance of emergency aid in relation to the reflections on 
the concerns and needs in the field. 
a. What kind of policy is essential for reflecting the concerns and needs of the 
countries affected by disasters? 
b. Is there any reliable method for donor countries to get information and data about 
the country affected by disasters especially in an earthquake situation? 
c. What kind of workforce, facilities, equipment, etc. was needed to response to the 
Haiti earthquake? 
d. What kind of measures were essential for the coordination of the KDRT’s 
operations relevant to the concerns and needs of Haiti, after its dispatch to the 
Haiti field? 
e. In the KDRT’s demobilization phase, was the consultation between the KDRT 
and the other relief agencies appropriate? 
2. The questions about the sustainability and potential of the activities of the KDR’s in 
the long term. 
a. (Asked of local agencies) What kinds of support systems and resources in the 
field were available for donor countries to link the relief and the midterm 
reconstruction and recovery phase? For example, when a temporary medical 
office established is enlarged to a hospital, what kinds of methods were made 
possible to connect it to the local health workforce? 
b. (Asked of exemplary foreign agencies) What kinds of systematic base in the field 
are possible to link the relief and the midterm reconstruction and recovery? 
c. What kinds of structures and resources used in the field actions are essential for
 the KDRT to link the relief and the midterm reconstruction and recovery phases? 
3. Was there any inadequacy in the foreign relief agencies in view of human rights? 
4. The questions about the scope of the relief aid. 
a. What improvement may be needed by donor country’s relief teams to better aid 
main target groups affected by disasters or crises? 
b. What may be needed for donor country’s relief teams to better cooperate with the 
local agencies in areas affected by disasters or the international organizations 
deployed in the disaster fields, for identifying target groups and setting and 
prioritizing goals? 
5. The questions about the efficiency (the ration of output to input) of relief operations. 
a. Were the activities of the foreign agencies including Korea and international 
agencies efficient? If not so, are there any suggestions for improvement in 
efficiency in light of experience? 
b. Do you think the local people affected by the earthquake are satisfied or not by 
the international relief efforts? From this perspective, are there any improvements 
you can suggest for future activities? 
c. Were the results of the international aid effort sufficient to reduce the loss caused 
by the earthquake and to aid recovery from the disaster? If not so, what area was 
most deficient and what were the causes in your view? 
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6. The questions about the long-term and comprehensive impact of the relief activities. 
a. What kind of impact was made on Haiti through the activities of foreign relief 
agencies? 
b. What are the lessons of the international community through the response to the 
Haiti earthquake? 
7. Please feel free to make any additional comment. 
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Survey regarding People’s Perceptions of and Motivations for  
Overseas Emergency Relief Activities 
 
Dear Mr./Ms./Miss./Dr. 
 
With the increased frequency and larger scale of natural and man-made disasters, the 
importance of international emergency relief has magnified. The United Nations has reported 
that the death toll from natural disasters since 2000 is more than 500,000 people. To keep 
pace with this trend, Korea has affirmed the intention to increase relief by amending the 
Emergency Relief Act and its enforcement ordinance. Specifically, Korea recently dispatched 
the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 Korea Disaster Relief teams to the Haiti earthquake field, and the teams 
involved 25 emergency medical staff who treated more than 1,300 patients. 
 
In relation to this, the evaluation team, which relates to the Korea International Cooperation 
Agency’s research project of the ‘Evaluation of the Korean Emergency Response System and 
Results from Past Experiences’, would like to examine the perceptions and motivations 
regarding overseas emergency relief activities within the members of the Korea Academy of 
Disaster Medicine and National Disaster Life Support. 
All information and data will be only used for academic research and recorded anonymously. 
All information and data will also be kept strictly confidential. 
 
If you participate in this survey, we deeply appreciate your cooperation. 
 
The evaluation team of the 
‘Evaluation of the Korean Emergency Response System and Results from Past 
Experiences’ 
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Ⅰ. Personal Details 
1. What is your gender? 
○ Male 
○ Female 
2. How old are you? 
(   ) year old 
3. What is your occupation? 
○ Doctor – emergency medical treatment (Go to Q. 4) 
○ Doctor – other non-emergency medical treatment (Go to Q. 4) 
○ Nurse – working in the emergency room (Go to section Ⅱ)  
○ Nurse – non emergency room work (Go to section Ⅱ) 
○ Emergency medical technician – working in the emergency room (Go to section Ⅱ) 
○ Emergency medical technician – non-emergency room work (Go to section Ⅱ) 
4. What is your position within your regular organization? 
○ Professor 
○ Pay doctor 
○ Private practice physician 
○ Fellow 
○ In Military service 
○ resident 
○ others (                                            ) 
 
 
Ⅱ. Perception Indicator 
1. Are you familiar with Korea’s overseas emergency relief activities? 
○ Yes 
○ No 
2. What do you think is the purpose of overseas emergency relief? Please tick the 
appropriate level of importance for each item. 
 
 Very  
important 
Fairly  
important 
Not very  
important 
Not 
important 
Boost national prestige in the international 
community 
○ ○ ○ ○ 
Saving of lives and medical support for the 
affected people 
○ ○ ○ ○ 
Recovery of social infrastructure of the affected 
country 
○ ○ ○ ○ 
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Friendship and cooperation with the affected 
country 
○ ○ ○ ○ 
Contribution to the improvement of the export 
industry 
○ ○ ○ ○ 
Others  
(                                                                                               ) 
 
Ⅲ. Training Indicator 
1. Are you aware of any training program for the workforce engaged in emergency relief? 
○ Yes 
○ No 
2. Did you pass any training program relevant to the overseas emergency relief? 
○ Yes (Go to Q. 3) 
○ No (Go to Q. 5) 
3. Through the program, was it an opportunity for you to better understand the necessity
 of overseas emergency relief and to acquire essential information? 
4. After finishing the program, did you still wish to participate in emergency relief work? 
○ Yes 
○ No 
5. Have you thought about completing an overnight itinerary training programme for the
 workforce of the overseas emergency relief teams? 
○ Yes (Go to section Ⅵ) 
○ No (Go to Q. 6) 
○ Already completed (Go to section Ⅵ) 
6. If not so, what is the most important reason for not thinking about completing this  
programme? 
○ A temporary vacuum of medical service 
○ I considered it unnecessary 
○ Not attracted to the contents of the programme 
○ Others 
(                                                                                                    )                             
                                                                  
 
IV. Experience and Value Indicator 
1. Have you participated in any overseas emergency relief activities? 
○ Yes (Go to Q. 2) 
○ No (Go to Q. 3) 
2. What was the motivation of your participation? Please tick all relevant items. 
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○ Request from a hospital 
○ Request from your government 
○ Personal motivation to help 
○ Others 
(                                                                                                                               ) 
3. Do you have in mind participating in overseas emergency relief activities in the 
future? 
○ Yes 
○ No 
4. Questions regarding your overall opinion of the overseas emergency relief activities.  
 Fully  
agree 
Partly 
agree 
Not  
sure 
Don’t 
quite agree 
Don’t  
agree at all 
Participation in emergency aid may meet the requests 
and expectations of the countries affected by 
disasters. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Participation in emergency aid may be helpful in 
boosting the prestige of donor countries. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Participation in emergency aid is humanitarianism, 
and this makes my participation significant. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
My family and I highly appreciate the significance 
and value of emergency aid. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
If I decide to participate in emergency aid, my family 
will esteem and understand my decision. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
I think that the participation may be a good 
opportunity for me to show my professionalism. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Participation may be helpful for me to broaden my 
mind such as acceptance of other cultures. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Participation may be a good opportunity for me to 
understand world poverty and to develop a more 
international view. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Participation may be a good remedy for my insipid 
daily life. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Participation may be a good opportunity for me to 
experience self-maturity. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Participation may contribute to developing greater 
friendship and cooperation between Korea and the 
affected country. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Participation may contribute to increased national 
interest through export to the countries affected by 
disasters. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Korea’s participation will have a positive effect on 
the disaster affected population’s perception of Korea 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Other (                                                                                                                                 ) 
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Ⅴ. Essential Indicators. 
Please tick only one answer in the right hand columns for assessing each factor’s importance 
to the overseas emergency relief activities. 
 Very 
important 
A little 
important 
important Not quite 
important 
Not 
important at 
all 
Passionate about emergency aid  ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Devotion to humanity ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Affection for the population affected 
by disasters 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Possessing interpersonal skills ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Possession of good language skills 
including English 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Observance of the principles of 
emergency relief 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Professionalism ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Korea’s efforts to ensure the safety and 
security of the emergency relief staff 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Financial compensation ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Career acknowledgement of the 
emergency relief activities 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
Ⅵ. Simulation 
These questions will investigate the obstructive factors that might hinder your participation in 
emergency relief activities. 
There is a big earthquake in a developing county. The temperature in the affected region 
often reaches 36℃, the death toll is more than 50,000 people and the size of the population in 
the disaster zone is also more than 500,000 people according to a formal report. In addition, 
the affected region has very poor in living conditions and is not safe. Under these conditions, 
Korea decides to dispatch a disaster relief team and you receive a request to participate in the 
team. The government gives an assurance of your safety and security through the 
mobilization of the highest level of resources possible. 
The departure time is in 24 hours and the travel time will take 15 hours. 
1. Do you accept the request for participation in the emergency relief team? 
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○ Yes (Go to Q. 2) 
○ No (Go to Q. 3) 
2. If so, why do you accept the proposal? (Tick all that are applicable) 
○ Boost the national prestige of Korea in the international community 
○ Feeling of duty to my country 
○ To save lives and give medical support to the population affected by disasters 
○ Show my professionalism 
○ Personal development 
○ New experience 
○ Embark on a new career 
○ Passion for emergency aid 
○ Others (                                                                                                                    ) 
3. What effect do the following factors have on your decision to engage in emergency 
relief activities? 
 Large 
effect 
Far 
effect 
Slight 
effect 
Little 
effect 
No 
effect 
It is a burden for me not to serve pre-planned 
medical treatment or work. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
My current employer will not allow me to 
participate. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Communication problems – even with 
translators readily available. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
It is very difficult for me to adapt to other 
cultures. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
The living conditions in the affected country 
are too poor. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
My safety and security cannot be completely 
assured. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
A lack of knowledge and experience 
engaging in the emergency relief activities. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
My family would object my participation. ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
No desire of the medical treatment to the 
population affected by disasters. 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Others (                                                      ) ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
4. If the planned work in changeable, will you accept the request for participation? 
○ Yes 
○ No 
5. If your current employer does allow your participation, will you accept the request to 
join the disaster relief team? 
○ Yes 
○ No 
6. What period of time do you think may be needed for emergency relief activities? 
○ Under 5 days 
○ 5 ~ 7 days 
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○ 8 ~ 10 days 
○ 11 ~ 13 days 
○ 14 days and over 
 
 
When you have completed all questions, please press the ‘finish’ button. 
 
 
Thank you for your participation.  
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